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I. A Short Sketch of Polish History before
THE br&AftU UUUHi UP WAHSAW
Among the many problems which demand the attention of the
world today is that of Poland, and the outbreak of the ^reat
War now going on in Europe has made this problem prominent.
Ever since the final partition in 1795, the patriotic poles have
held closely in their hearts the idea of a reunited independent
country. Uprisings in Russian Poland in 1831, 1 in ualicia in
2 31855, and in Russia in 1863 showed that these ideas were alive.
/II through the nineteenth century, revolts against their repress
ion have proved that the spark of independence still glows, /nd
now that this Great War threatens to change the political bound-
aries of Europe what dreams may the Poles not have in mindl But
what nation now would undertake to help them? /II of the ureat
Powers, England, trance, Germany, and Austria have at one time
or another professed to be their friend but one after the other
hss seen fit to fall away. The one occasion when their hopes
and ambitions seemed about to be realized was at the time of the
establishment of the Grand Iiuchy of Warsaw by Wapoleon I in 1807.
To understand the situetion thoroughly it is necessary to
learn what the conditions were that led to the destruction of
Poland; for there must be a cause inside the kingdom to allow
such a large country to be divided "at will by its neighbors, in-
dent Poland in 830 lay between the Vistula and the Oder, and
extended north a little beyond modern Posen and almost as far
1. /lexinsky, u. Modern Russia , 298.
2. Cambridge modern History , vol. II, 46.
3. ibid.
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south es the Carpathian mountains. 4 Karly Polish history is di-
vided into three periods: from 830 to 1386; from 1386 to 157£;
from
and/1572 to the time of its disappearance as a political state
in 1795. Larly in the first period warfare was the common occupa-
tion and the government was a rough military despotism. This was
softened somewhat when in 855 Roman Catholicism was introduced
into the country by missionary monks, and Poland can he regarded
from that time as 8 staunch champion of the faith. It is inter-
esting to notice that about five years later the Greek orthodox
5
religion found its way into Russia, and the differences of re-
ligion between these two countries was to be an important factor
in their later history. The Poles extended their military con-
trol over the Bohemians, the Prussians, and the Saxons, and suc-
ceeded in Christianizing the Bohemians and the Prussians. The
Saxons had been christianized by Charlemsgne in the ninth century.
Miring the reign of casimir I in the early eleventh century there
were numerous revolts of the peasants resulting from the heavy
taxes imposed upon them. 6 it is the persistent oppression of the
peasants that constitutes one important factor in the loss of
Poland. Their position became more degraded rather than more
enlightened; thus the peasant sank while the noble rose and there
was no intermediary class between to use its influence for the
betterment of conditions. In this first period, foundations were
laid for later political institutions. The "Magna charta" of
Poland, es it is called, arose when Louis of Hungary, in ascend-
4. Fletcher, J., History of Poland . 4.
5. Morfill, W. Russia . 25.
6. Fletcher, History of Poland . 15.
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ing the Polish throne in 1370, took an oath to exercise limited
7power and to obey the will of the senate or assembly of nobles.
But this apparent charter of freedom contained the seeds of fatal
weakness. The laws of Poland had been fo ?med into a regular code
by Casimirll about e quarter of a century earlier.
The second period
f
from 1386 to 1572, is marked at the outset
by the addition of Lithuania to Poland, consummated by the mar-
riage of the daughter of Louis of Hungary and Jagellon, Duke of
Lithuania; religious wars raged in Europe during this time and
Poland became an asylum for the persecuted Christians. The var-
ious kings tried to obtain complete control, but jealousy was
rife among the nobility and in time the king became a mere fig-
ure head. This jealousy was no doubt heightened by the union of
Lithuania to Poland; on neither side were the nobles willing to
give in politically or religiously. Lithuania had the Greek or-
thodox religion. The king could neither levy taxes nor call out
an army, and in fact could issue no legislation. The revenue
was completely in the hands of the diet and thus the king was
deprived of even the powerful instrument money to be used for the
purchase of authority. 8
The entrance of the third period of early Polish history
ushered in the elective system of kingship. Sigisraund, the last
of the Jagellons
f
left no male heir, and the crown of Poland was
restored to the jealous subjects to do with as they liked. j»s
they would not think of bestowing it on one of their own order,
7. ifletcher, History of Poland , 38.
8. ibid,, 62.
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the crown became a prize for foreign princes, for there were
still enough temptations connected with it to attract candidates.
Poland was involved in wars with the Cossacks, Russia, and Sweden
and at this time she triumphed over Kussia to the extent that
Q
Russia's Tsar was carried as a prisoner to Warsaw. 9 Later, Po-
land suffered defeat at the hands of the Swedes and Casimir III
was forced to abdicate. It is said that Charles liustavus of
Sweden proposed a partition of Poland between Prussia and /ustria,
but the Tsar declared war against Sweden and the attention of
Charles was diverted from his plan. 10 In the reign of Casimer III
the 1 j berum veto
,
by which a single disagreement could stop the
proceedings of the diet, first assumed a legal form. 11
Poland seemed to be in a state of great prosperity, but in-
ternal difficulties were destined to prove its ruin. The popula-
tion was far from being homogeneous; religious differences also
caused trouble, for the Poles were changing from a tolerant to
1 2
a rigidly intolerant people. fe The artisans had been eliminated
from the diet and the peasants were being more and more oppressed.
Polish towns became more wretched and trade was gradually ruined
by the selfish class legislation of the Diet. 1^ i'hus by the mid-
dle of the eighteenth century Poland was already launched far on
the way to disasters which were to culminate in the three parti-
tions and the final political extinction of the kingdom in 1795.
jj'rom the time that the crown became elective foreign interest
9. Fletcher, History of Poland , 79.
10. ibid. , 85.
11. ibid., 89.
l£. Lord, K. H. , The Second Partition of Poland , 26.
13. ibid., 27.
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in Poland quickened. Ho doubt the neighbors hoped to add some
or all of its territory to their own. trance claimed to be in-
terested as an ally and friend and her ties were strengthened by
a marriage and by an old traditional policy. The daughter of the
exiled king of Poland, Stanislaus, had become the wife of Louis
14
XV. furthermore, Poland was one of the pivots of French policy
in Eastern Europe along with Sweden and Turkey, and might be used
either to take the Hapsburgs in the rear or to checkmate .Brand-
enburg- -Prussia and Russia. Hence France endeavored to estab-
lish a predominant influence in Poland, but failed to see that
the way to help Poland was to reorganize its government.
Austria was the chief rival of France for the friendship of
Poland until about the middle of the eighteenth century. Her
interest, however, was rather of a defensive nature and it was
her main effort to keep Poland from attaching herself either to
France or Prussia. There was no cause for unfriendly relations
for they had several interests in common* their religion was the
same, and frequent royal marriages bound them together. It would
have been much more worth while for Austria to take a hand in the
affairs of Poland than to allow Kussia to get such a foothold;
but jealousy prevented reason and diplomacy from being parties
in the arrangements, and as long as Prussia and France could be
-I c
kept out, Austria was satisfied.
Prussia, on the other hand, was a persistent enemy, for the
tiohenzollerns were rivals of Poland in the name of the Teutonia
14. Fletcher, History of Poland , 173.
15. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland , 37.
16. ibid., 40.
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Order for the country about the mouth of the Vistula. Could the
Polish republic be broken up, the scattered possessions of Prus-
sie might be bound together by the annexation of the Polish land.
cast Prussia and Pomerania could be united, and a portion of
Great Poland would connect Silesia with .cast Prussia. xhe idea
of the dismemberment of Poland had been alive in Prussia since
the time of the Great Elector; and not only had this idea been
entertained earnestly, but it was a traditional policy of Prus-
17
sie to prevent any hostile power from gaining control. it was
not in a very gracious manner, then, that Prussia objected to the
establishment of trench and Russian candidates on the throne of
decaying Poland.
Russia seemed to be equally anxious with Prussia to keep
other nations out. she felt that her interests were the most im-
portant and she looked with jealous eyes toward Poland for nation
alistic reasons. Lithuania had once appropriated a part of west-
ern Russia, and the Muscovite rulers and heirs felt bound to re-
the feeling
cover their ancient home. Another important reason wajs/that
these peoples were of the Orthodox religion and should be freed
18from the oppression of Homgn Catholicism. The political and
nationalistic motives were not a valid excuse, for the races in
Poland had been so long separated from their Russian brothers
that hardly a trace of the old political resemblance remained.
The only traditional motive that remained was that of religion.
Poland had developed into an extremely intolerant country and the
17. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland , 40.
18. ibid. , 41.
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urthodox clergy besought St. Petersburg for deliverance, when
the government did interfere, the motive was for political pre-
dominance. Kussia claimed that her interference was in self-de-
fense, since although Poland was weak, she might make trouble
for Russia if she fell into the hands of Russia's enemies.-*- 9 It
was through polish territory only that the other nations in Eu-
rope could hope to approach Kussia by land; and claims on Polish
friendship were strong in 1719-20, when (ieorge I of England was
anticipating a war with Russia. .gain during the wars of 1735-39
and 1741-43 when the western nations wished to strike at Russia
they tried to ally themselves to Poland. It was clearly prudent,
then, on the part of Russia that she obtain control over Poland,
either as a gateway to, or a barrier against, the West.
The idea of the dismemberment of Poland had been common
2(
arao-ig the powers of Europe for a hundred years before it occurred.
Peter the Great seems to have considered a partition and during
the Seven Years' V/ar it was Russia's intention to acquire uour-
land from Poland in exchange for the conquered province of hast
Pi
Prussia. Under Catherine II, events worked up to a climax
which resulted in the first partition and finally in the extinc-
tion of Poland. Catherine II has had much of the blame for in-
terfering in Polish affairs, but as we have seen, she did not be-
gin the deed but consummated it. One of her policies was to gov-
ern the Kepublic by influence and still to preserve its integrity;
another was to annex territories from time to time, but this would
19. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland , 43.
20. ibid. , 44.
21. ibid., 44.
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necessitate considering .Austria and Prussia. j^ach country must
have territory to enlarge and make complete its empire, and Rus-
sia, under Catherine II, whose exorbitant claims overbalanced
the others, took the lead. Catherine seemed ready to adopt eith-
er of the policies, just as the circumstances might permit. She
began interfering in Polish affairs in 1763, but did not take up
the campaign until after the death of Augustus III, the last of
the Saxon kings, which occurred in the same year. 23 She was urged
to do so by the Czartoryskis before .Augustus III died. The pop-
ularity of these brothers with the Saxon king had been destroyed
through jealousy, and they immediately appealed to Catherine for
help in reforming the Polish constitution, promising in return
to recognize the Imperial title of Peter the ureat and his suc-
cessors, a thing which the Republic had persistently refused to
do. 24 Now that Catherine had a hold on one of the most influen-
tial families in the Republic, and the throne was empty, she
struck a hard blow at the tottering state. Frederick of rrussia
was an ally of Catherine II, and she succeeded in putting a can-
didate of her own on the throne, who must obey her because she
could cast him aside if he ventured to oppose her. Stanislaus
Poniatowski attempted reform, but Catherine saw to it that no
change for the better should be made which might hinder her plans.
<*hile the czartoryskis had shown their weaker nature in hum-
bling themselves before Catherine, they did not hesitate to strike
25back, but their station before the law was not equal to hers:
22. Lord, 1'he second partition of Poland , 46.
23. Cambridge Modern History , vol. VI, 666.
24. ibid., 200.
25. ibid.. 667.
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Catherine could command and be obeyed; the czartoryskis could
only remonstrate. The patriotic Poles rebelled but Catherine
only tightened her grip. Just at the time when the .empress
seemed to have achieved success, Turkey, urged on by trance and
Prussia, declared war on Russia in behalf of Poland. 26 Cather-
ine, however, was successful in the war. Prince Henry of Prus-
sia was at the court of Kussia at this time. Mention of a par-
tition of Poland had been made before this, and during a conver-
sation in which Prince Henry and Catherine were the participants,
Catherine suggested that everyone should help himself. 27 A par-
tition treaty was signed in 1772 between Russia and Prussia, Aus-
tria holding off until in the summer. Poland lost about one
third of its territory; Russia obtained the palatinates of Pol-
ock, .Vitebsk and Mscislau, as far as the rivers Irwina and Dnieper
Austria had for her share Galicia and a portion of Podolia and
Little Poland as far as the Vistula; Prussia obtained Polish prus
sia, with the exception of Lantzig and Thorn and their territory,
and part of c-reat Poland as far as the river i^otec. 28
^ach of the three powers would now have to watch the others
and maintain "Polish integrity," which Austria had been the first
to violate. Poland became, in practice, a tributary state of
nussia. A perpetual council of state under the presidency of the
king, in which executive power was vested when the Diet was not
in session, was established. The officers of the crown could
be dominated and all branches of public service were brought un-
26. Cambridge Modern History
, vol. VI, 668.
27. ibid., 669":
28. Fletcher, History of Poland
.
277.

10
der a common direction. administration for the first time had
29
some unity and vigor. The array was reformed according to the
Prussian plan and a national system of education was founded.
Although Poland had greatly improved along financial and mili-
tary lines, she had not come up to the standard which Catherine
was willing to allow. Thus Poland was ill prepared for the sec-
ond great crisis in 1792. A new event occurred which had to be
reckoned with, and that was the rise of a new social middle class,
well-to-do and enterprising, one which would be of immense impor-
tance in the last struggle for independence.
Events which led up to the second partition were set in mo-
tion by the Russo-Turkish war of 1787 to 1792. Catherine II
sought the alliance of the Poles and asked for recruits for her
army. Prussia and .^ustria had exchanged places in alliance with
Russia, and Prussia likewise begged for Polish favor, trying to
make clear that to ally themselves with Russia would certainly
insure more Russian domination in Poland. Poland accepted the
alliance with Prussia and Russian influence was, for awhile, over-
31
thrown. The liberum veto was abolished and the Russian troops
withdrawn from Polish territory. No haste was made in the adop-
tion of the reforms and a valuable opportunity was allowed to
pass. It is a characteristic of the Poles at almost any crisis
of their country's history that they are slow to act, and thus
they lose what would have been of immense profit to them. But
the patriots and the mercantilists did not wish to give up any
29. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland
,
58.
30. ibid., 59.
31. Cambridge Modern History , vol. VIII, 525.
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more of their territory, and especially to Prussia, and Polish
tradition was opposed to the idea of a hereditary king, for that
was contrary to Polish liberty; furthermore , the nobles hesitated
32
to admit urban delegates to the Diet. Prussia was chagrined
by the obstinacy of Poland and would no doubt find it to her in-
terests to repudiate the alliance and revert to her old policy of
keeping Poland weak. The Diet, which had met at We. r saw, con-
tinued to discuss reform, but no beneficial decisions could be
made because every decision harped back to unanimity of vote. A
slight coup d a undertaken and Stanislaus brought forth
plans for a new Constitution. Followed by most of the Deputies,
he proceeded to the Cathedral to take the oath to support the Con-
stitution, so that a greater solemnity might be added to this
important step.
Poland was triumphant. Executive powers were to be in the
hands of a hereditary king and six responsible ministers; and
legislation was to be vested in a Diet of two houses. The lib-
34
erum veto was suppressed. The maintenance of the Constitution
of May depended, however, on the action of the neighboring states
Austria had reverted to the policy of a strong Polish state, and
35
stood ready to oppose the ambitions of both Prussia and Russia,
for such a state would strengthen Roman Catholicism and revive
Austrian influence in northern Germany. In 1791, Prussia and
Austria signed a treaty agreeing to guarantee the integrity and
the free Constitution of Poland; to invite the elector of Saxony
32. Cambridge Modern History , Vol. VIII, 525.
33. ibid. , 526.
34. ibid., 527.
35. ibid. , 529.
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to accept Polish offers to the crown; and to prohibit a prince
of any of the three powers from ascending the Polish throne.^
As long as this agreement held, Russia could not act. Early in
1792, Russia signed a treaty with Turkey and thus Catherine could
turn her attention toward Poland, 'ihe French Revolution "burst
forth into a foreign war and the monarchs were drawn together to
aid Austria, on whom the war had been declared. Catherine made
distinct and private agreements with Prussia and /ustria to pre-
'
^7
vent opposition to her designs on Poland. Word was sent to
Poland that reforms must cease, and shortly afterward a Russian
army entered Poland. Prussia withdrew her support and once more
Poland was in the hands of Russia. Stanislaus had signed the
act of the confederates, and patriot officers were discharged
and the army disbanded.^ Fletcher seems to think Stanislaus
"a hero in words at least. He seemed to be willing to sac-
rifice himself for his country but his actions did not give ev-
idence of it. Prof. Richard Lodge says, "Stanislaus in spite of
his oath had never joined the army nor left Warsaw. He was neith
er fool nor hero, and he would not commit himself to what he
knew to be a hopeless struggle."40 u doubt he acted as well as
he could considering the position in which he was: Catherine and
her spies were on one side of him, and the jealous nobility of
Poland on the other. But when he' had the support of so many of
his subjects at the time of the Constitution of M&y 3, it seems
36. Cambridge Modern History , Vol. VIII, 530.
37. Fletcher, History of Poland
.
308.
38. ibid., 311.
39. ibid., 310.
40. Cambridge Modern History , Vol. VIII, 532.
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almost inexplicable that he should have given up. One cannot
but think that the roots of his patriotism flourished only when
he had the support of another power, uut however that may be,
he signed Poland away to Russia. The Prussian troops entered
Great Poland in 1793, Prussia having announced that Jacobinism
was gaining ground. 41 Russia demanded that the Diet sign the
treaty for the part ition,which was done under armed compulsion,
42September 5, 1793. Catherine advanced her frontier into the
middle of Lithuania and Volhynia; Frederick obtained the remain-
ing portion of Great Poland, and a part of Little Poland. 4^
The partition of the rest of the unfortunate country was
inevitable. Russia ruled Poland by severe military means, and
did not intend that the rebellious Republic should ever gain the
upper hand egain. The Poles revolted, but they were utterly de-
feated by Russia and Prussia. The revolution in France encour-
aged the two powers to put an end to the Polish uprisings. The
Germ^r powers, Austria and Prussia did not succeed in restoring
the French king on the throne. They decided to embark on another
campaign against France in 1793; Prussia was to be indemnified
44
by Catherine v/ith Polish territory; /ustria was to exchange
45the low countries for Bavaria. England now came out of her re-
serve and opened a correspondence with the allies, but she refused
to have anything to do with the war when it was learned that Po-
land was to suffer. Early in 1793 negotiations were again opened.
41. Fletcher, History of Poland , 312.
42. ibid., 320.
43. ibid., 321.
44. Zversley, Lord, The Partitions of Poland
.
147.
45. ibid., 149.
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Fox fought bitterly against war; Burke said that there was no
government in France with which to ally themselves, and that
Poland might be so partitioned that the balance of power in Eu-
rope might not be disturbed. England entered the war for the
46port of Dunkirk. All three armies met with reverses, and the
duplicity of the agreements of Austria with England and Russia
ed
turn, the attention of all except England away from France, /us-
tria said that if England would not consent to the Bavarian ex-
change, she would look for indemnity in Poland; on England's re-
fusal to recognize the exchange, Austria replied that her troops
would be withdrawn from France. At the same time Catherine
was informed that the scheme of exchange had been given up and
that Austria now looked for indemnity both in France and in Po-
48
land. The Prussians, in 1794, became alarmed at the uprisings
in Poland against the Russians and neglected to send their army
to aid England in spite of the fact that England 1 s allowance for
a Prussian array continued to come. The English minister finally
informed the home government of the true nature of affairs, and
the allowance ceased. 49
The Poles had been aroused because of the Russian policy
with regard to soldiers on Polish territory; Russian soldiers
had been kept there at the expense of the Poles. 50 The situation
was not so very unlike that of the American colonists, who had
supported British soldiere before the American revolution. Dis-
46. Fversley, The Partitions of Poland
,
160.
47. iDid., 167.
48. ibid., 166.
49. ibid., 188.
50. ibid.. 173.

content was growing and French victories stimulated the Poles to
definite action. They called Kosciusko to the front as leader of
the new national movement and the Russians were driven from Wer-
saw. When Catherine heard of the revolt she came to terms with
the i'urks as quickly as she could, but it was not until in the
summer of 1794 that she could give her attention to Polish af-
52fairs. She immediately claimed the assistance of Prussia.
/ustria was consumed with jealousy at the thought of Prussia's
securing a share in Poland again, and she set about making peace
with France so that she might look toward Poland also. 53 The
Empress hinted at a share if the Austrian troops should aid in
suppressing the rebellion, but the English stood in the way of
peace; and it was without regret on the part of ^ustria that the
fate of the campaign was decided against the allies. England
was left to do as she pleased, while ^ustria and Prussia were
wrangling with Hussia about indemnity in Poland. It was not the
proud and vacillating king of Prussia who led his army to defeat
the Polish patriots, but the veteran Russians under Suvarrov.
The Prussians were retreating as rapidly as they could toward
54posen. Kosciuszko "'as taken prisoner by Suvarov and Warsaw fell.
All Poland seemed paralyzed at the news of Kosciuszko
' s defeat
and capture. Although the Poles fought obstinately to keep the
Russians from gaining Prega, fate seemed to have decided that
Poland should be no more. 55 nussia, by the last partition, ac-
51. Eversley, i'he Partition of Poland
.
174.
52. ibid., 204.
53. ibid.
, 191.
54. ibid.
, 222.
55. Fletcher, History of Poland. 342.

16
quired the remaining portion of Lithuania, a great part of Sara-
ogitia, part of chelm on the right bank of the jcug, and the rest
of Volhynia. Austria obtained the greater part of the palatinate
of uracow, the palatinates of Sandomir and Lublin with part of
Chelm, and parts of Brzesc, Polochia, and kasovia along the left
bank of the Bug. On the right of the Bug, Prussia received por-
tions of lre sovia and Polochia in Lithuania, part of the palatin-
ates of Troki and Sarao ~itia, and a district of Little Poland
forming part of the palatinate of Cracow. ^
Thus by these three partitions, the kingdom of Poland was
wiped out, but the hope of its recovery burned restlessly in
the hearts of its former citizens, wherever the exiled patriots
gathered, a "Confederacy" was formed, the aim of which was to
wreak vengeance on the three powers and restore Poland to her
ancient rights. Such was the position when the attention was
attracted to their fate of a greet man who was to do much in
arousing their hopes. Napoleon Bonaparte was at the head of a
campaign in Italy directed against the /;ustrians, and had as one
of his aides-de-camp, a Pole, Suckowski. The latter urged the
confederates to interest Napoleon in their favor. So success-
ful were they that he promised Oginski that as soon as the war
in Italy should end, he himself would lead the French and oblige
the Russians to restore Poland. Bourrienne in his memoirs
expresses the conviction that Bonaparte did have the avenging of
58
the Poles deeply at heart. Oginski had been sent to Constan-
56. Fletcher, History of Poland
.
344.
57. ibid., 352.
58. isourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte, vol. Ill, 17.
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tinople to negotiate in favor of the Poles, but Napoleon said
that the Turks would make fine promises which would amount to
nothing. The other countries, England included, discouraged the
thought of independence. France, to whom liberty meant every-
thing, was the only country which held out any encouragement.
The confederacy at Paris sent emissaries into Lithuania and Ga-
licia to form new confederacies. True to Napoleon's prediction,
59the Poles received no benefit from Oginski's mission to Turkey.
The French ambassador in Zustria urged the Poles to definite ac-
tion contrary to the advice of Oginski, and it is thought that
he did so in order to ascertain what troops were in tfalicia. It
was a fatal movement for the Poles, who were obliged to break
up their assembly and disperse.
^
The death of Catherine II relieved the Poles of one of their
worst tyrants, and her successor, Paul, released the imprisoned
Poles and allowed the exiles to return from Siberia. Prussia
w,us planning to restore the constitutional government, with a
AT
Prussian prince on the throne. Austria, whose former policy
had been one of defensive friendship, was now oppressing her
Polish subjects, and did not ease the persecutions. Some Poles
were put in prison and some were hanged, but these actions of
violence did not stop others from joining the French armies which
were in Italy. A plan was laid before the Directory in France
to raise a Polish legion of refugees, who would serve under s
French general against their common enemy, Austria, but at this
59. Fletcher, History of Poland . 353.
60. ibid., 354.
61. ibid., 356.
6£. ibic., 357.
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time the French Constitution did not allow any foreign troops to
be taken into its pay. The project was laid before the Cisal-
pine Republic which had lately been formed in Lombardy by Bona-
63parte, end a Polish legion was formed. The Poles fought
bravely and were even induced to invade Hungary. With their
aid the treacherous oligarchy of Venice was laid low. It was
with no little regret on the part of the Poles that the treaty
of Campo-Formio was signed in 1797, in which not a mention of
Poland was made. Napoleon always expressed the highest admir-
ation for the Poles and said that everyone who was a friend of
64liberty was a friend of theirs.
The Polish legions were now the representatives of their
nation and kept the name of Poland before Europe. They fought
at Rome in 1798, and in 1799 they entered in the campaign against
the Russians and the lustrians. At the fearful siege of Mantua,
which was compelled to capitulate, many of the Poles were seized
and forced to enter the Austrian ranks. The first legion was
almost annihilated at Novi. This same year saw Napoleon's re-
turn from Egypt and his rise to the consulship, and the Poles
were taken directly into the service of France.^ 4 new Polish
legion was employed in the army of the Rhine* After the treaty
of Luneville in 1801 their services ended for awhile, and some,
becoming disgusted because no advantages were gained for the
Poles, deserted. The remainder of the legion were ordered to
St. Domingo to aid in putting down a negro rebellion, but nearly
63. Fletcher, History of Poland
.
357.
64. ibid., 360.
65. ibid., 362.
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all of these perished. The few that did survive fell into the
6 6hands of the English and were taken to Jamaica. All hope for
a re-established Poland seemed to have vanished.
66. Fletcher, History of Poland, 362.

20.
II, The Establishment of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
V/hile the peace of Amiens contained no mention of the Poles,
they were not altogether forgotten. In the reports of Napoleon
there were extensive references to the bravery of the Polish le-
gions which hr.d fought under France, o.nd in the bulletins of the
army honorable mention was made of some who had distinguished
themselves in the campaigns in Italy and Egypt."'" But in spite
of these mentions, the Poles felt th«t they were neglected and
many of them began to look elsewhere. Czartoryski, who was an
2
assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Russia, knew
that Russia and England were arranging for a meeting at which
plans for a league to preserve peace in Europe were to be intro-
duced. Those nations which had been forced unwillingly under for-
eign rule, meaning of course Italy, Holland, and the smaller de-
pendencies of Napoleon, were to be restored to their ancient
rights. Czartoryski submitted a plan to Alexander for the rear-
rangement of Europe, and one of its most important articles was
that about Poland. The Emperor of Russia, taking the title of
the King of Poland, was to have all the territories that had be-
longed to Poland before the first partition as one of his shares
4in the new plcn. * If this plan had been successful, Alexander
might, after a time, have been liberal minded enough to give them
their independence. It is perhaps better that it did not succeed,
for it is aoubtful whether the Poles coula have put aside their
1. Memoires de Michel Qginski
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petty jealousies long enough to work together peacefully. Their
use of the later opportunities opened to them seems to prove that
the kingdom could not have been maintained successfully had
Czartoryski ' s wild ideas been fulfilled. They continually looked
back to the old order of things, and I believe that legislation
could not have been carried through rapidly enough to make even
a temporary government sufficient to tide them over a crisis.
The plan for the third coalition was successful with the
one exception that Prussia could not be drawn in with the other
powers. Her price was Hanover, and as this was not guaranteed
to her, she remained neutral. Russia threatened to declare Po-
land a kingdom, and by this event Prussia would have lost the
territory she had gained in the three partitions. She remained
obstinate and the allies began action without her. Alexander de-
clared himself firm in his intent to restore Poland, as a king-
dom under the sceptre of Russia, and England said that if Poland
g
were to be restored she would give her consent. It seemed as if
Czartoryski 1 s plan with reference to Poland were to be accepted
now, although it had been refused -aX the meeting of the powers.
The Tsar was well received by the Poles and one who was particu-
larly influential, Cginski, spoke highly of him and was deeply
touched by the interest that the Tsar took in his family. He
was very grateful to him for the protection of his patriots and
the confidence he had in them, but more than all for the pro-
mised regeneration of Poland. 6
.t this time, Napoleon had declared himself King of Italy
5. Czartoryski
.
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and thus not only threatened Austria hut Russia as well. To
reach the allied armies, Napoleon brought some of his troops
across Prussian territory, thereby incurring the displeasure of
this country to such an extent that she began to prepare for war.
Austria now became alarmed at the intention of Russia and rushed
her troops to the Galician frontier, demanding of Russia that
this frontier should be maintained if the kingdom of Poland were
restored. Napoleon pushed forward and defeated the allied pow-
ers on the field of Austerlitz. The Russian Emperor and the Em-
peror of Austria were obliged to flee for safety. Czartoryski
felt that the fate of Poland rested on this day; he remarked sev-
eral years later, when Alexander was planning for a reconstruction
of the kingaom, that the most suitable time for doing anything
for Poland was past, referring to the time before the battle of
Q
.-.usterlitz . By this victory Russia, Prussia, and Austria were
obliged to recognize the demands of Napoleon, and his forced pas-
sage through Prussia had proved to him that Poland had not ceased
though
to exist in spirit even/it no longer existed as a political state.
The prospects which had seemed so dark for the Poles after
the peace of Amiens were fanned into flame again by Napoleon.
Secret agents and emissaries were sent into the Russian- Polish
provinces, and decrees were published under the name of Oginski.^
In November, 1806
,
Napoleon also sent overtures to the Polish na-
tion, announcing to the patriots that Kosciuszko had come to the
7. Czartoryski, Vol. II, 98.
8. ibid., 107.
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front to join with the French for the establishment of Poind.
These proclamations aroused all of the enthusiasm of the Poles
and heightened their hopes through the dark days that came. The
desired effect was obtained, for Napoleon knew that these brave
people would be very useful to him in the war against Prussia
1 p
and Russia. November 19, 1806, the Emperor of France received
the deputies of the palatinate of Posen. He told them that France
had never recognized the partitions of the unfortunate Poland, andi
since the events of war had thrown him into their country, it
conformed with his principles to receive the representations of
that royal kingdom. As Emperor of the French, he would see with
a keen interest the throne of Poland re-established and the in-
dependence of that grand nation assured. He informed them, how-
ever, that more depended un them than on France, but the politi-
cal principles which led France not to recognize the partitions
of Poland made him desirous of seeing Poland restored, and they
were assured of his powerful protection.
We will agree, I think, that the Poles should help them-
selves, but we cannot blame them for being thrilled at the thought
of such powerful help, and rallying to the French side. Their ac-
quaintanceship with Napoleon was yet young and there had been no
extraordinary and brilliant promises broken to shake the faith
of the Polish people. A few such as Czartoryski, Oginski, and
Kofcciuszko placed little faith in his promises and did not fel-
low with their country. Oginski, at his home ne&r Vilna, knew
12. Memoires de Michel Oginski , ,Vol. II, 336.
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that Napoleon, well knowing Kosciuszko T s influence over the Poles
was making urgent overtures to him to induce him to join the army.
Oginski could not believe that it whs Napoleon's intention to re-
establish Poland and above all to make it free and independent;
neither could he enter into a project which he felt would not be
successful , nor share in the hopes of the elated Poles. He af-
firms that he saw in the Emperor of France a conqueror with a de-
vouring ambition, and e despot; one who was repugnant to his
14principles and who repelled all hope of confidence. Napoleon
was not a little chagrined by the refusals of Kosciuszko.
The inhabitants of Prussian Poland were electrified at the
news of Napoleon's approach, and volunteers flocked to the vic-
torious banners of the French, who entered Warsaw in triumph.
The exultation of the Poles knew no bounds when Napoleon estab-
15lished his general headquarters at Posen. Murat, in writing
to Napoleon
t
said that the people were very much disposed to aid
and were highly elated ax the approach of his troops. Rich
and poor, strong and weak, talked of nothing but the past glories
of their nation, and of the fact that at last an cvenger had come
to aid them in the restoration of their brilliant kingdom. Ev-
erywhere, the national hymns were sung and people took part in
the parades and the fetes that recalled the glorious traditions
17
of the past. The Polish ladies were charming beyond words and
they have been regarded as much more dangerous than the men. It
is they who urged the men onward and kept alive their national
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traditions. 18 Napoleon himself in telling of his reception said
there was a great national movement and everyone rich or poor
was in arms. "The first passion end the first desire of every
Pole is to re-establish their nation; already they have taken up
19
their ancient customs and habits," he wrote. J Te Leum was
sung lecember 2, 1806
f
in honor of the anniversary of the coron-
ation of the emperor, und balls were held.
In the Chamber of Warsaw, Poles replaced German officials.
Napoleon set about to organize a legion of Poles who had deserted
from Prussia and Russia, but he was very careful not to encourage
further desertion and he warned his colonels in their proclama-
20tions not to mention the name of Poland. In his own proclama-
tion to the soldiers he said, "It is in vain that the Russians
have defended the capital of that ancient and illustrious Poland
The eagle of the French floats on the Vistula. The brave and
unfortunate Poles believe that they see again the legions of
Sobieski after the return of that memorable expedition." 2^ He
excited them by recalling their past disasters, the victories of
Catherine, the Massacre of Pr? ga, and the devastation of their
castles by the Cossacks. The Poles asked him to make a march of
like
'
their country and attach it to his empire Holland or lalmatia.
He, however, intended to use them abroad. He told them that he
was surprised b.t the amount of patriotism that still burned within
22them so long after they had been conquered. He then ordered the
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legions of Poland to be commanded by officers of the Polish no-
23bility. Just as with his own soldiers, Napoleon knew how to
touch the hearts of the Polish soldiers by referring to past
victories in which perchance some one of them might have had a
part. Napoleon was a good actor and so far in the career of his
destiny he had not failed to carry his soldier audiences with
him. Those patriots who looked with doubt on the enthusiasm creat-
ed by Napoleon hoped that the Tsar would not allow so powerful a
man to come near his frontier. Czartoryski t who was near Alex-
ander and was always on the watch for some advantage to be gained
for Poland, urged the Ts^r to proclaim Poland as a separate state;
but to all of these repeated supplications Alexander had replied
that the time to do away with the iniquities of Poland was the
time when other abuses were abolished in Europe. Then all wrongs
could be righted, and the privileges that he, Czartoryski, sought
25for Poland could be granted. as before when urged to act quick-
ly, Alexander hesitated too long, and Napoleon, by his flattery
and promises, won the confidence of the Poles. .No one knew what
he meant to do for Poland and one can only make assumptions as to
what he might have done for the nation; but judging from his mo-
tives as ordinarily interpreted, the evidence is very much in
favor of the belief that he was using them for his own convenience.
..s a result of the numerous proclamations of Napoleon, the
Poles were fired with a hope of recovering their independence.
But Napoleon demanded that if he was to restore their nation, he
23. Correspondence de Napoleon i er , Vol. XIII, 530.
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must have evidence that they could maintain it. Troops were
levied to serve in the war in addition to those who had volun-
teered. In speaking of the deputation that came to Napoleon,
Talltyr-nd said th> t it was numerous and was made up of some
of the most illustrious men of Poland. They made addresses to
the emperor and offered him all of the forces of the country.
Napoleon seized upon this offer, and explaining himself little
as to the rest of their demands, he replied that when they had
an army of forty thousand men they would be worthy to be called
26
a nation and have a right to his protection. Napoleon could
have used the volunteers very well, and here was an offer which
would fill his own thinning ranks; Talleyrand remarks that Na-
poleon reorganized Poland in such a manner that she became very
27
useful to him at the opening of the campaign.
The Russian array that had occupied Warsaw evacuated it as
the French approached. Later, at St. Helena, Napoleon said that
the Poles were called upon to leave the Russian service and fight
with the French for liberty and independence. ° Side by side
with the French the Poles fought bravely at the battle of Eylau,
a victory accorded to Napoleon only by the silent retreat of the
Russians during the night. Napoleon did not return to his head-
quarters in Poland but drew his troops into cantonments across
East Prussia. He wished to make a separate treaty of peace with
Frederick William and to restore to Prussia all of the land east
of the Elbe. He attached no importance whatever to the Poles,
26. Broglie, Luc de. , Memoirs of Talleyrand , Vol. I, 233.
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oo
now that he knew them better. This was just what Oginski
thought would be the outcome of Napoleon's promises to restore
Poland. .but it cannot be said thet he promised to restore Poland
outright for he was too tactful to bind himself by broad state-
ments, he said, "Shall the throne of Pol' nd be re-established
and that great nation take again its existence and its independ-
29
once?" This was in 1806 before the campaign in Poland. In
asking such a question he did not commit himself to any promises
or agreements. Little by little the other patriots woke up to
a number of facts: that Kosciusz^o had resisted Napoleon's pro-
positions; that his signature had not been attached to the procla-
mations issued in his name; that Napoleon had never entertained
the idea of re-establishing Poland on a basis as powerful and in-
dependent as she had formerly been, because it would have been
out of harmony with his preceding system, of making a conquered
territory a dependency of i'rance; and, finally, that the Tsar
Alexander and the Emperor Napoleon were negotiating a peace in
which the latter was to sacrifice the interests of Poland for
his own. In aH of his plans in the year 1807, Poland was not
the most prominent, as he tried to make it appear; indeed, one
can almost say it was a part only in so far as he needed the aid
of the Polish people. Their reward did not obstruct his pathway
toward betterment for himself. Having used them, and a more pro-
fitable plan appearing before him, he was now prepared to cast
them aside as readily as he had taken them up.
28. Correspondence de NapoleW ier , vol. XXIV, 70.
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Cz8rtoryski had again repeatedly urged the Tsar to make
overtures to the Poles in spite of the fact that the balance
was on the side of Napoleon. Jj'or Russia to re-establish the
Polish nation would swing the pendulum in her favor and the sit-
uation would be reversed. CztLrtoryski put forth this argument.
"Instead of Russia^ being exposed to Bonaparte ? s seductions,
she would be able to raise her inhabitants against him; and by
re-establishing Poland an outpost would be created behind which
she could remain intact with all her forces at her command. The
cause of anxiety as to the conduct of the Poles and every motive
for speculating on such conduct on the part of her enemies would
81be forever removed." Bonaparte would have had greater diffi-
culties in invading Russia; and if Russia should make use of the
policy of retreating until victory was assured, then Napoleon
would be far from his supplies and so harassed by hostile Poles
in his rear that his defeat under such circumstances would have
meant nothing short of an absolute surrender.
To declare Poland a separate kingdom would not have meant
the separation from the Empire of one of its integral parts; but
the crown of Poland would have been irrevocably attached to the
throne of Russia and, at the same time, the Empire would have
joined the remainder of Poland. It might have been necessary
to give them a government in conformity with their wishes and
their ancient laws, but while he was doing this, the bond be-
tween the Empire and the Polish nation would have been strength-
ened and rendered more indissoluble. 32As things now stood, Poland
31. Czartoryski, Vol. II, 167.
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was a source of continual anxiety and suspicion for the Russians,
and for the jj'rench, a source of safety. But as before, Alex-
ander hesitated to act, and Napoleon won the support of the Poles
f
who fought with him in the campaigns of 1807. After the fatal
battle of jj'riedland on June 14, 1807, the Russian Emperor consent-
ed to an armistice with Napoleon which was to develop into a
peace decidedly contrary to the ideals of the Poles.
.11 Europe resounded with the victory of Napoleon ,and every-
one was anxiously awaiting the outcome of the interview that was
to take place in the middle of the Niemen. A Polish patriot,
Count Linawski, said, "My heart smote me at the thought of
that interview. It is the moment when the fate of Poland, the
true friend of France, is going to be decided. Nowhere else
in Europe is France and the Emperor going to see a people better
disposed and more fitted to be a loyal ally and brother in arms
than the Polish nation. The Russians detest you (the French;;
the Germans do not love you, and the fanatical Spaniards rebel
among themselves. The Poles alone remain and will remain by
inclination and by tolerance." With vague and flattering
words Napoleon won his way into the heart of Alexander ,who al-
lowed his ally, Prussia, to be torn to pieces and bowed to the
ground. Prussia lost all of her territory west of the Elbe; the
Polish provinces which were annexed in 1793; the southern part
of west Prussia acquired in 1772; Kattbus which was assigned to
Saxony; and lantzig, which with a radius of ten miles was created
34
a free city. Lantzig was one of the important cities of Poland
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•and very necessary to her commerce^ but as a free city she was
now lost. It seems to me that Napoleon could scarcely have dealt
a blow more crushing than this of depriving the Poles of Dantzig f
for it was because of this city and Thorn that the Poles had
hesitated to come to terms with the Prussians in 1792. The re-
ward of the Poles was not the restoration of their grand and il-
lustrious kingdom which Napoleon had led them to believe it
would be, but the creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw out of
the Prusso--Polish provinces. Nor was this made official until
1808. Lven though disappointed in not realizing their ambition,
the Poles were very enthusiastic about the Grand Duchy, for it
seemed but a step further to the restored kingdom. Oginski, who
was not in the immediate vicinity, presents another point of
view which Sorel shares. it the meeting in Tilsit, the two ne-
gotiators agreed to speak as little as possible of Poland, but it
must have been at Napoleon's suggestion, for I believe that Alex-
ander was disposed to do all he could for the Poles. It was dis-
heartening to the Poles to have the one in whom they had placed
their confidence and trust, and who promised to have their in-
terests foremost in his mind when a peace should be made, take the
iniative against them. In the final agreement between Kussia
and France a new obstacle was cretted between them: Poland was
35transformed into a frontier of the Grand Enpire. When Oginski
was questioned as to the prospects of Poland, he expressed him-
self as against all trust and confidence in Napoleon. Had the
Emperor of U'rance entered and ocuupied \ oihynia and Lithuania
35. Sorel, L' Europe et la Revolution ij'rancaise . Pt. VIII, 186.
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he would not have united them with the Grand luchy of Warsaw but
would have made separate duchies of them. Out of the Polish pro-
vinces taken from Prussia he would make a duchy of Mazcbia or
of Warsaw but never the duchy or kingdom of Poland. 36 When Na-
poleon was a general in Italy, Oginski had had great faith in
him end had even urged the Poles to interest him in their affairs.
Moreover, he himself addressed a letter to the "Citizen General"
in which he invoked his immediate aid in restoring the overpowered
37
nation to liberty and independence. Sis attitude later, in
1807, shows that his convictions had changed, and he often re-
gretted the hasty letter he had written. The displeasure of many
of his best friends was incurred because he was strong in the
belief that Napoleon did not mean to re-establish Poland. 3° Had
Napoleon entered Lithuania it was very likely that the inhabitants
would have received him with open arms. »vhile they were in that
attitude a courier brought to Vilna the news of the Treaty of
Tilsit; the general opinion which resulted from the news was
that Napoleon was satisfied at having been recognized by Alex-
ander who wes the only leader he feared on the continent. Poland
was not considered in the treaty, end far from being reunited,
a portion of it was ceded to Alexander and Napoleon would have
ceded to him the portion of which he created the Grand Duchy but
Alexander refused. 39 This treaty of Tilsit was regarded as the
gr&ve of all the hopes that had been conceived of seeing Poland
re-established, ^nd from that period the confidence in Napoleon
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was weakened in the provinces belonging to Russia. 4^ The form-
ation of the Duchy of Warsaw corresponded imperfectly to the
ideas entertained by the Poles who had recently been under the
sceptre of Prussia. But in giving the Duchy of Warsaw to the
King of Saxony Napoleon pleased the Poles, for he was the prince
who had been c&lled to the throne of Poland by the constitution
of May 3, 1791 when the election of kings was abolished. 4^ The
Poles were again allowed to have a short period of rising spirit s
t
and here again they believed that another step had been taken
which was to reunite Poland. But the Grand Duchy was just another
link in Napoleon's chain of dependencies by which he was gradual-
ly enlarging his sphere of influence in Europe and which was to
lead him on to greater influence and finally a world empire.
Napoleon was under two fires, as it were, between Alexander
and the Poles. He must work for the advantage of both, but ulti-
metely for neither. He had appeased the Poles with their Grand
Duchy and Saxon king, and the next to be considered was Alexander,
who was assured that there were not the slightest intentions of
restoring Poland. At one time Napoleon hf d hinted that he created
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as the basis of a project for the restor-
42
at ion of Poland; this was for Polish errs. Later he announced
that he had promised the Emperor Alexander not to augment the
Duchy of Warsaw and to do nothing further tov/ard restoring Polan
Lenz thinks that Alexander was disappointed with the arrangements
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of Poland and in the hopes which had drawn him into the war, for
44the Tsar had hoped to have the whole of Galieia. He must have
seen by this time that Napoleon was a friend as long as things
were going his way; indeed, Napoleon's attitude toward the Poles
when he wished to make pe«ce with Prussia illustrates this policy.
Pavout s&ys that .Alexander did not favor the creation of the
Grand Duchy, but that he was so flattered by the concessions made
to him after his defeat that he did not remonstrate against the
44
actions of Napoleon, ^ourrienne is of the opinion that Na-
poleon guaranteed to Alexander the shares of Poland already
possessed by him and even offered to enlarge it by the addition
of .»arsaw and the whole of Prussian Poland. It was not until
after this generous offer had been declined by Alexander that he
formed the Duchy of Warsaw and gave it to the king of Saxony. 45
We must ask ourselves why Napoleon was so generous in giving
away that which was really not his to give. whither was his star
of destiny leading him? Before any more criticism of his methods
are offered it must be plainly impressed on our minds that Napol-
eon had committed atrocities no worse than those committed by
Hussia, Austria, and Prussia. The thing which makes it seem so
startling is that he worked by leaps and bounds. A magic wand
was waved and all was changed. The ideu had to grow on the other
nations and the poor victim, Poland, was vivisected slowly until
all life as a political existence had ebbed away. JBut the fact
that the other nations were guilty of crimes, if we wish to call
them such, does not in the least excuse Napoleon. He had been
44. correspondence du Davout . vol. II, 2.
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offered the Polish forces it is true, but I think that he advanced
north in order to excite them. He secured their aid and left it
to fate to decide what should be done for them 8t the close of
the c^jnpiiign. He accomplished his purpose in gaining the alliance
of hussia and now to keep /lexander' s friendship he overloaded
.lexander with attention. I believe that had the campaign failed
against itussia, Napoleon would have recreated the fallen kingdom,
but only in order that he might succeed in crushing /lexander.
nis star of destiny, however, guided him to his goal and he now
had to dazzle the great man of the north. It is not surprising
that Alexander should have opposed the Grand jjuchy, for it would
inevitably become the nucleus of a new Poland , and to accept it
would bring the two great empires too closely together.
napoleon w<*s not as generous as it may seem in offering this
large amount of territory to Alexander, jj'or napoleon to be bound
by territory in the north, would keep his attention from the
Orient and his idea of a world empire. In giving the Polish ter-
ritory to Alexander, the problem of solving the Polish question
would have devolved upon him
t
and at the same time he would have
owed allegiance to France. Bourrienne remarks that insurmounta-
ble obstacles existed in the way of the restoration ,and it is
likely that some of the obstacles were those mentioned. He thinks
however, that it was unfortunate for trance and Europe that it
was not re-established and of course 'what might have been' is
always a thing of regret, napoleon planted the Grand Luchy of
,arsaw on the banks of the Vistula in order to avoid touching the

36.
Russian and .".ustrian provinces of old Poland, with the intention
of increasing or destroying it as he saw fit. The Poles were
led to hope for better things and he ensured to himself partisans
46in the north should the chances of fortune call him thither.
46. .tiourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon nonaparte , vol. Ill, £1.
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III. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw from 1807 to 1812
Whether the assumption as to the motives of Wapoleon in
creating the Grand Duchy of Warsaw are true or not, now that it
was under his watchful eye, he set about making changes in the old
order of things and instituting the ideals of freedom <md liberty.
4 committee named by tsonaparte drew up a constitutional statute
which was signed by him at Dresden on July 22, 1807. The main
articles were that the religion of the state was to be Roman
Catholic, but lib arty of worship was guaranteed to all, and all
were recognized as equal in the eyes of the law; the slavery of
the peasants was abolished; the dietines, combined after a new
process with departmental assemblies, elected a Diet which was :
divided into two chambers. The Duke possessed the initiative in
the laws, the nomination of senators, of the presidents of the
dietines, and evf:n the presidents of the departmental assemblies.
His ministers formed a council of state; they could dissolve
and
the Dietsj_/appoint the judiciary order, the judges exercised
their functions for life. 1 The Duchy was divided into six de-
partments: Posen ^Kalisch, Plock, Warsaw, Lomza and Bydoszez. i'he
poles had the satisfaction of being under the government of a
prince who merited their affection and esteem; of seeing their
brave Prince Poniatonski at the head of the department of war,
and respectable citizens occupying the first posts of the state,
uut to counteract all the improvements and privileges given to
them, they had to support the numerous drench troops on their
1. Oginski, Memoires, vol. II, 347.
*
territory and to contribute to the expenses of the civil list
which W8S excessively disproportionate to the population. Here
as in Italy, Spain, and Holland, Napoleon left in his trail
heavy taxes. The King of Saxony, who would gladly have lightened
their obligations, could not resist the vexations of the military
government of Napoleon. Many landowners had to sell their es-
tates or else give thera up to the administration of the public
p
treasure. Napoleon's private secretary, Leneval, lays the blame
of the unfortunate treatment of the Poles on Pradt, his ambassa-
dor at Warsaw, pradt would revise all reports that came from,
or proceeded to, the emperor. When the iumperor learned of this
3
state of affairs the ambassador was severely reprimanded. But
the world did not know that his orders were being disobeyed and
so attached the blame to Napoleon. No doubt the latter exerted
a powerful influence over Meneval, so that his reports are some-
what biased. The King of Saxony was very much devoted to Napoleon
and the Poles hoped that conditions would change and that Poland
would be reunited. They anxiously awaited the departure of the
4jj'rench army before putting the new constitution into effect.
If the changes made in this constitution could have been carried
out effectively, there is no reason to think otherwise that the
country would have prospered, j*ut serfdom was only abolished in
theory and the freedaen remained virtually in their old position.
Military affairs alone received much attention and some Polish
2. Oginski, Vol. II, 347.
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regiments were equipped. The Emperor took over into his pay
some of the troops of Poland hut even that did little to relieve
the constant drain which was made upon the country. Napoleon
was content to make an appearance of reconstruction and to at-
to £
tsch/himself
,
hy an extension of power, the Duke of Poland.
He even fluttered himself that affairs were settling down by
saying that the mott perfect harmony reigned between the army
7
and the people of the Duchy of Warsaw.
Within the nuchy party faction was again astir. One party
was made up of nobles and their retinues who had lost their lands
when the peasants were freed, in order that the latter might be-
come proprietors; they were neither the friends of the Emperor nor
the partisans of France. Kussia alone had conciliated their good-
will by hardening serfdom, and a constitutional oligarchy was the
dream of that small number of patrician families. The aid of
France was agreeable to them as far as there was any sacrifice
promised, and there was an indulgence of hope to them for their
deliverance from the presence of enemies when the conquest was
Q
achieved. This is no more than Napoleon did when he offered to
sacrifice the interests of the Poles before the treaty of Tilsit.
The other party of which Uavout speaks was composed of nobles who
were clearly for the true interests of their country, cund having
no fear of ^'r^nce, they hoped for its support. The Poles, or at
least some of the leading families, had begun to suspect trance,
5. uambridge Modern History , vol. IX, 339.
6. i/avout
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and it was feared that should war "break out, Poland would not side
with France. It was unfortunate
t
so Davout says, that the King of
Saxony had so much right of intervention in the affairs of the
government and that Poniatowiki succeeded in getting so many
of his own party into power. The government was changing from
9
a national to a military character. It was true that some of
the Poles distrusted Napoleon and even those outside the Grand
Duchy did not flock to his new creation. One who particularly
held aloof and who once had the opportunity of informing Napoleon,
that he would rather live uncer Russia than in the Grand Duchy, was
Oginski. He informed Napoleon that Alexander endeavored to please
the Poles, to soften their misfortunes, and gain their affections?
.Alexander promised the Poles of Russia a government entirely Pol-
ish and a constitution like that of May 3 ,and those who had served
in the Polish army and would now enter the service of Russia, he
11promoted to high positions. In Lithuania, however, the crea-
tion of the Grand Duchy was almost a promise to restore Poland,
and all wver the province everything which bore the name of France
was received by them with an eagerness which went almost to im-
prudence. The governors of the interior feared that a rebellion
might break out in the army and in such a case the welfare of
lexander was threatened. Afc While Alexander was thus endeavoring
to conciliate his new subjects and those which had come under
9. Correspondence du Davout , Vol. II, 84.
10. Oginski, Memoirs . Vol. II, 351.
11. Correspondence du Davout, Vol. II, 35.
12. ibid, , 44.

41.
his sceptre by the partitions of Poland, Napoleon indirectly at-
tracted them to himself. His great victories and his own at-
tractiveness won him many followers.
When the Prussians heard of the great army which was being
formed in Poland, they began to be suspicious, and Polish officers
discharged from the service of Prussia informed Davout that the
Prussians hoped for war. They were agitating the reunion of
the Buchy of Warsaw to Prussia and the cession of Galicia at the
14
same time. To do this would involve them in a war against
Austria and France, but they were hoping for the help of the Poles
and there was a strong Polish party in Prussia. In 1808 a re-
bellion broke out in Spain and Napoleon employed thousands of
Poles to aid in restoring quiet to that peninsula. J great
many of the patriots were won over to Prance, and Napoleon's
half promises of a new Poland led msny to volunteer in order that
Napoleon might come to their aid.
Czartoryski had resigned from the Imperial Council at St.
Petersburg shortly <after the treaty of Tilsit, on account of the
creation of the Duchy and the immediate help that seemed about
to be given the Poles; but as the French army continued to oc-
cupy Poland he began to turn his attention again to Russia. It
was Napoleon's policy to bow Prussia as low as he could and in-
deed it seems that he was about to finish the annihilation of
Prussia and erase Austria from Europe. Napoleon would not have
13. Correspondence du Davout , Vol. II, 44.
14. ibid., 145.
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stopped with conquering Prussia and Austria but would have in-
vaded Russia, claiming the Polish provinces and reestablishing
, ,
16
Poland. Alexander became alarmed and his counsellors began to
15
agitate the question of Poland again. The uneasiness of the
Tsar was noticed by the French Emperor who arranged for an inter-
view with his ally at Erfurt. He assured the Tsar that his at-
titude toward Poland was the same as he had held at Tilsit und
that he would do nothing to add to the Grand Duchy, or proclaim
1 7the restoration of the kingdom of Poland. Napoleon informed
the world that the primary object of this second interview with
the Tsur was to ensure peace and that both of them had resolved
18
to make sacrifices to that affect. This announcement could
hardly have pleased the Poles. for only by a war could they hope
to be reunited. Davout says that ever since Alexander passed
through the Grand Duchy on his way to Erfurt, the Prussians had
tried to make the inhabitants uneasy. Even Czartoryski seemed
to be turning again to his Majesty Napoleon, for in a talk given
before the senate of the Duchy his ideas were such as to lead
1
9
one to think that the only hope of restoration lay with France.
In this I cennot help thinking that Davout was mistaken, for while
the prince did resign from the Imperial Council of Russia, he
always kept in touch with Alexander and was always bringing upo
some plan for peace in which he urged Alexander to declare him-
self King of Poland. If he did lean toward France it was only
15. Sorel, L' Europe et la Kevolution Franchise . Pt. VII, 306.
16. ibid., 307.
17. ibid.,
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for a short time, for in 1809 we again find him taunting the
Tsar for having allowed such arrangements at Erfurt.^
Napoleon's overbearing policy was sure to produce a break
somewhere; and it came a year later, in 1809, with /ustria, who
tried to form a coalition against ^ranc' in order to set the en-
slaved countries free. She found herself single-handed in the
war and even one of the countries on which she had counted, Rus-
sia, acted in alliance with France. Near /ustria was the Grand
Duchy whose inhabitants might provoke to insurrection the /ustro-
Polish provinces. The campaign in the north took place in Poland,
and the Austrian general endeavored to capture Warsaw, which was
occupied after a fierce struggle, but Praga, its suburb
f
remained
£1
in the hands of the Poles. The attention of the enemy was
diverted to Galicia, and when their forces were strengthened in
that province, the city of Warsaw was relieved. The Austrians
tried to gain several other points of advantage in Poland but were
obliged to fall back. An armistice brought hostilities to a close
and the decision of the war lay with the main army in Poland.
Poland was poorly defended because most of the Polish troops were
in Spain or in garrisons in Prussian fortresses. It was their
brave prince Poniatcwski who, having been obliged to surrender
22
7/arsaw, now won it back from the Austrians. J^'rom the beginning
of the Polish campaign, communications with Kussia became more
frequent, but after the occupation of Vienna by the French they
19. Correspondence du Davout , vol. II, 296.
20. ibid., 143.
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almost ceased.
Poland was reduced more thrn ever to poverty by the ravages
of the war tfor not only had the French army continued to live
off her country hut she had to support the Polish army as well, the
expenses of which should have been borne by France. By the treaty
of Scho'nbrunn or of Vienna in 1809 the western part of Galicia
was added to the Duchy of Warsaw, a provision which was contrary
23to the treaty of Tilsit. Jomini makes Napoleon say, "In real-
ity the Russians were individuylly dissatisfied with the treaty
of Tilsit and especially with th^t article which created the
Duchy of Warsaw, for they dreaded the restoration of Poland as
much as the loss of their own empire; they were ignorant of the
secret article which forbade its re-establishment. I must con-
fess that in this mbtter I exhibited more independence and bold-
ness than redress and foresight. I desired the restoration of
Poland and I was not likely to exhibit on this occasion anything
ion 24like pusillanimous regards for the opin_/of Russia." Neither
the Russians nor the Poles knew whether to trust Napoleon or not,
but as before Napoleon's cajolery won their confidence and they
flocked to his army to enlist in the name of liberty. Since
Galicie and the mines of Vieliczka were added to the Duchy
prospects seemed bright for the kingdomyet to the Polish depu-
tation who came to him Ponaparte said, "Poland is a Question on
which all negotiations with Russia fail. Russia sees quite well
23. Memo ires de Michel Oginski, Vol. II, 358.
24. Jomini. LTfe of Napoleon I e r . Vol. Ill, 137.
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that she is vulnerable only through Poland. If I were Emperor
of Russia I would never consent to the least increase in the
Duchy of Warsaw, I know that the re-establishment of Poland
would balance all Europe but you see Russia would never consent
unless her armies were all totally destroyed. The re-establish-
ment of Poland is not at this moment within the power of France.
25
I will not make war on Russia." But Napoleon would not have
hesitated to declare war on Russia had it been to his advantage,
and as we shall learn later he did have a war with that nation
and he remarked that hostility was as good as its alliance for
26
the Continental System,
Alexander had felt that Napoleon was being deceptive ,and
when the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was enlarged he was not a little
irritated. Napoleon intended to manage Alexander, the Orient,
and Poland so that Alexander could cast himself on the Turks or
on the Poles. Later Alexander expressed the hope that the words
Poland and Pole would disappear in all political transactions and
27
even from history. At this news the Russians feared an upris-
ing in Lithuania .where the Polish language was spolen; where a
Polish army was organized; and where national institutions were
numerous; but the 'i'sar meant that he hoped that these names
would disappear from French history. For himself he wished to
absorb Poland in Russia or unite it as a state attached to Russia.
25. Johnston, Thg Corai c,±r\ , 318.
26. Cambridge Modern History , Vol. IX, 486.
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When Prince Czartoryski heard of Alexander's words he ac-
cused him of becoming the chief enemy of the Polish nation and
name. He excused himself by saying that every Russian emperor
would have done the same; the prince reminded him that Poland
could have been restored without being injurious to Russia. On
the contrary it would have been a great advantage. The Tsar
said he was not sure of any return on the part of the Poles, but
Czartoryski hastened to inform him that he had done nothing to
merit return; he had on the contrary alienated them. The only
thing possible to do now was to grant a separate organization
to those under his rule, and Napoleon would not have consented
to that, for it was his sole idea to influence the Poles and use
28
them as tools. Alexander assured the prince that if he went
to war with France he would declare himself King of Poland in ordei
to gain the Poles to his side, but he was dryly informed that it
would be too late. The Duchy of Warsaw which had been augmented
by the Austrian war strengthened and maintained the patriotic
sentiment of the Poles. It was a sort of phantom of ancient
Poland which produced an infallible effect on all who regarded
29that country as their real fatherland. Late in 1609, the Tsar
brought forth a plan for a reconstruction of Poland,which was
to form a kingdom of Poland out of the Duchy and Galicia, and
to allow the inhabitants of the Polish provinces of Russia to
30
serve in the new kingdom as if it were their own country. This
28. Czartoryski , Vol. II, 193.
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plan surprised the prince very much "but he was doubtful as to its
success.
Napoleon was not overly anxious for a break and he tried
to cement the feeling more strongly by proposing a marriage be-
tween himself and the sister of Alexander. The Tsar tried to
take advantage of this moment of intimacy to obtain Napoleon's
signature to a treaty to the effect that the kingdom of Poland
would never be re-established.*^ But Napoleon on getting the
refusal though not formally, of the Tsar for the hand of the
Grand Duchess Anne, refused to sign the treaty, because, as he
said, if some day the Lithuanians or some other circumstance
would bring up the re-establishment of Poland he would be obliged
to oppose it by armed forces.^2 Thus Napoleon by his tact and
cunning blocked one plan of Alexander for a time. In the summer
of 1810 Oginski carried a complaint of the abuses of the inhab-
itants of Lithuania to Alexander, who listened very respectfully
tc them. An article had recently appeared in a Paris paper about
the machinations of the father of Prince /.dam Czartoryski. The
Tsar seemed very much agitated and expressed to Oginski his fear
that the Poles were being alienated by the flatteryof Napoleon.
He also believed that they hated the Russians. He said that he
had not taken part in the partitions of Poland and he always had
condemned it. is for the Russians, those who were living today
were most of them not coupled with the misfortunes of Poland.
31. Sorel, L 1 Europe et la Revolution Jj'rancaise . Pt. VII, 4E9.
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Oginski took advantage of his outburst and told him how he him-
self felt toward Napoleon. He said, "Napoleon needs to attach
the Poles to him and to flatter them by fine promises; as for me,
I have always esteemed your nation and I hope to prove it to
33you some day," Alexander promised a redress of grievances.
The harsh measures in Lithuania ceased and great enthusiasm was
expressed by the Poles for the Tsar, particularly in Vilna. It
would be very difficult now for Bonaparte to obtain help from
Lithuania should he wish to declare Poland a kingdom.
Napoleon on the other hand was striving very hard to
keep the friendship of the Poles, and he always made a show of
his interest in the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy, especially
when Oginski, who was now a representative of Kussia, was near.
A rupture with Kussia was inevitable, and Napoleon tried to make
the Poles believe that a re-est- blishment of their kingdom would
follow as one of the results of the war. He praised their bravery
and attached them to his person. He enlarged their numbers in the
old legions and created others composed of those who distinguished
themselves in the campaign of 1809. Besides this he organized a
corps of Polish lancers which became a part of his guard and for
34
which he showed great affection. The i»uchy was taxed beyond
endurance and it is only justifiable to think that Napoleon would
have lightened their burdens, but it became evident that Napoleon
was more interested in destroying English commerce than in re-
33. Memoires de Michel Oginski . Vol. II, 371.
34. ibid., 377.
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storing Poland. An incident happened which might have proved
fatal to France as far as polish allegiance was concerned had
not Napoleon intervened and smoothed the matter over quickly.
The minister of the interior in giving an account of the actual
state of France in ix public speech which appeared in al}. of the
papers announced that it had never been the intention of the
Emperor Napoleon to re-establish Poland. This alarmed the Poles
in general; but it was of short duration, because Napoleon caused
Marshall Duroc to inform the members of the government at Warsaw
35that it was a joke on the ambassador of Russia. Oginski wished
that the plan of re-establishing Poland might be consummated ,but
he never believed in the possibility of the project: first,
because of the topography of Kussia and her vast resources; and
second, because he did not think that Napoleon would ever vol-
untarily proclaim its restoration, but was merely using it as
a motive to attract the Poles to his side.
Marshal Duroc voiced his opinion on the re-establishment
of Poland by saying that the plan for making it independent was
chimerical, for it was a dream never to be realized. Poland had
long been ruled by anarchy and had been lost through the jeal-
ousy of her nobles and their disunited opinions. Oginski was
very much wrought up by this news una began a careful study of the
situation in Poland. He tried to interest Alexander still more
in the welfare of the country and urged him to declare himself
King of Poland, he advanced the arguments that Napoleon with all
35. Memoires de Michel Oginski, Vol. II, 379
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his united forces would not be able to resist the power of Kus-
sia, for his ambition would lead hirn beyond the Dnieper and in
ancient Poland it was certain that he would not assure to it
a constitutional and representative government, to carry on a
conquest of Poland and a second campaign the following year would
mean more burdens on the already overtaxed people. If war should
be made on Kussia, and Alexander should reunite the Polish pro-
vinces to the Grand Duchy, he would find it to his advantage to
give the Poles a constitutional government first of all. He
seemed to be sincere in hiB wishes to help the Poles, and I think
that he recognized the deceits that were being practiced by
Napoleon. It can be said of Alexander that he did not electrify
the Poles by any rash promises which he failed to carry out. He
often talked of restoring Poland, but as far as can be judged, he
did not set himself upon a pedestal as their deliverer and re-
storer. Aside from the times when he was under the influence of
Napoleon he had their grievances sincerely at heart and in so
far as he could he tried to alleviate them. Dealing with such
an involved epoch of the world* s history, it is difficult to
assign any particular motive for any action; but Napoleon's acts
were numerous enough for one to make a fairly good estimate of
his motives, which seem to have been concerned chiefly with him-
self and for his own advantage.
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It was with all sincerity and due respect to the Poles that
again in 1811 Alexander took up the question of Poland. He
endeavored to learn the sentiments of the Poles, particularly
those of the Grand Duchy of war saw, and whether they would accept
an offer. He expressed himself as believing that if a war
should occur between ij'rance and Kussia, it would be a war to
the death. "The support on which the Poles can rely is limited
to the person of Napoleon . Should he disappear from the scene
the consequences to Poland -.vould be disastrous." 38 Czartoryski
in his reply says that there was a unanimity of intentions and
objects both in the army and among the inhabitants of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw. They wished for the reunion of all Poland into
' 39
a single national body under a national and constitutional regime.
He knew, too, that the Poles would accept an offer from anyone,
if it inspired more confidence and greater guarantees of success
than they possessed through their union with tfrance. The Poles
were ready to fight with Napoleon, yet they did not trust him.
The jj-rench Emperor led them to think that it was not lack of good-
will that prevented him from carrying out their plans for a restor-
ation, but lack of power, jbut Napoleon had always been successful
and it was not easy for anyone to imagine that he should ever fail.
One thing which the Poles would take from anyone w.^s a con-
stitution, and it was probable that a promise of one and evidence
of the fulfillment of the promise would lead to the abandonment
38. Czartoryski, vol. II, £16.
39. ibid., 218.

52.
of Nupoleon. czartoryski suys th^t to overweigh Napoleon's pro-
mises these things would be indispensable : "first t the restoration
of the constitution of May 3, 1791, which is graven in -inefface-
able characters on all Polish hearts; second, the reunion of the
whole of Poland under one sceptre; third, the re-establishment
of outlets for trade; and fourth, a reasonable prospect of suc-
cess against Napoleon."4 ^1 .Alexander's reply was that Poland
would be forever united to Russia, whose JWnperor would bear the
title of Emperor of Hussia s.nd King of Poland, The Kingdom of
Poland would be formed, in the first instance of the Duchy of
Warsaw and the Hussion provinces. 41 With all of these plans in
view and a number of prominent Poles at work on a constitution
I cannot help but think that Alexander was sincere. Their la-
bors were interrupted by the approach of Napoleon's troops, when
the inevitable rupture between Russia and Jj'ranee burst into open
warfare.
40. Memoirs of Czartoryski . Vol. II, 220.
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IV. The Breach of 1812
In 1811 Oginski pissed through the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
and reported that it was a picture of misery and distress.
Beautiful Poland which had once supported flourishing fields of
grain was now a scene of ruin, and mu,ny estates had been abandoned.
The military spirit of Napoleon seized the people and they ardent-
ly desired war. After carefully investigating the situation
around vilna, Oginski came to the conclusion that Napoleon was
looking toward a world empire, and the first occasion for a rup-
p
ture with Russia would be welcomed. If that was the case it is
doubtful whether Napoleon would have taken time to notice Poland.
More than likely, he would continue to hold out offers to Poland
until his object had been obtained, and then he woula be too
strong to be resisted by the Poles. Poland would be a taunt to
Russia in the coming war, and once the Poles were with him, he
would be their master. Oginski was certain that he would not
re-establish the kingdom, but if such a thing came to pass, Poland
would not be a free, powerful, and independent country, because
that was not in accordance with his principles nor with the
plan which he had hitherto followed. What was more probable
was that the Poles would have a king of Napoleon's choice and
that instead of making their own laws they would find a Code
Napoleon in force; instead of gaining back their ancient rights
and privileges they would be making contributions to the French
1. Memo ire sde i.qchel Oginski , vol. Ill, 23.
2. lbTdT; 24.
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government. The kingdom of Poland, instead of becoming again
a power in Europe, would be more crushed than ever; national
character would become demoralized and a long series of unin-
terrupted wars with Russia would reduce the country to a sit-
uation where no hope could ever be entertained of a restored
national existence.
Alexander felt that a war was coming, but he did not intend
to be the one to attack. Oginski tried to persuade him to at-
tach Lithuania to the Duchy of Warsaw and declare it a kingdom
under Russia, but the Tsar knew that this would provoke war. It
was suggested in place of that project that the eight governments
in Russia, which were a part of old Poland, be united under the
4
name of Lithuania. As Napoleon had Poles who were working on the
possibility of a restoration, so now Alexander hac in formation
a plan first to give his Polish subjects a government and then
eventually to unite the provinces outside of Russia with Lith-
uania and declare the kingdom of Poland restored. If his own
Poles were happy and contented then it would be safe for him to
look to those outside of Poland. The Tsar listened very atten-
tively to all the plans that were proposed, but he was inter-
rupted in carrying them out by the approach of Napoleon. The
articles submitted, had they been put into effect, would certainly
have won many aspirants to Alexander's side. The eight provinces
in Lithuanie would be formed into a single province under the
name of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania which would be ruled by a
governor whose residence would be at vilna. There would be a
4. Memo ire sde Llichel Oginski . vol. Ill, 41.
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chancellor named by the Lithuanians for the direction of public
affairs. The interior administration would be conducted by a
council of administration presided over by the governor or lieu-
tenant of the emperor, the council being formed of several de-
partments. There were to be general regulations for public ad-
ministration. The contributions to the government, levying of
troops ,and administration of justice were to be controlled by the
Grand Luchy. The statute of Lithuania would continue to be the
civil law of the Grand Luchy of Lithuania and the language used
was to be Polish. The funds for public instruction were to be
5
separate from all other branches of public revenue.
In spite of the fact that Napoleon was rapidly advancing into
Russian territory Oginski addressed a memoir to Alexander in which
he recited the past policy of Napoleon toward the Poles. The
Poles had been wiped off the map of Europe, but they had ever
retained their national spirit, and this spirit would be crushed
forever by Napoleon if it became his advantage to do so. The
Poles did not care any more for Napoleon than was involved in the
hope of regaining their country by his aid, and if he showed any
great signs of weakening, he would be abandoned. He needed their
services now and he would try to keep them near to him. He knew
that once the people of the Grand Luchy of Warsaw might become
hostile to him, the Poles of ^ustria and Prussia would unite with
them, and if Alexander should create a Grand Luchy of Lithuania
he himself would lose some of his hold over them. Those residing
outside of Russia would demand a constitution similar to that of
5. Memo ires de Miohel Oginski . vol. Ill, 77-80.

Lithuania end the right to use their own language. The Austrian
Poles, while not badly treated, were constantly rebuffed by the
new order of things; customs and laws which seemed impositions
were constantly interrupting their old habits. The Prussian
Poles were forced to drop everything pertaining to their country
and to become German as rapidly as they could. Without a doubt
had the Tsar had an opportunity to complete his plans. Napoleon
would have found a Polish army not waiting to join him but wait-
ing to oppose his passage through their territory. All the en-
thusiasm excited by Napoleon might pass to Alexander and the
Grand Luchies of Warsaw and Lithuania in that event would be
united and the throne of Poland re-established under one scep-
7
tre. Oginski felt that if Alexander should start the war he
would surely have the support of the Poles. Napoleon expected
Alexander to prevent the establishment of Poland on the part of
France, but he was not expecting to plan a restoration, for at the
treaty of Tilsit the i'sar was loath to give up any of his terri-
tory acquired by the partitions of Poland. The longer Alexander
hesitated the more Napoleon gained. But Napoleon had already
advanced into Polish territory and was making brilliant promises
to the Poles.
Napoleon had heard through reports sent to him from Vilna
that the Emperor of Russia wl.s seeking to attach himself to the
Poles of the Russian provinces by benefices and conciliatory
measures. The French Emperor therefore gave the impression that
6. Memo ires De Michel Oginski , vol. Ill, 97.
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he was about to declare Poland independent, but these preced-
es
ings of /l^xander made it more urgent that he should do so.
He appointed Talleyrand to carry on negotiations but the prince
divulged the plans thus making it neceseary to postpone further
action until after an alliance with Austria. Accordingly in
March, a secret alliance with Austria was contracted, and Austria,
as well as Prussia, with whom an alliance had been concluded in
February, agreed to give up their Polish provinces for the re-
stored Poland if Napoleon should re-establish it. They were to
receive an indemnity out of the territory that would be conquered
9
in the war. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on thj.£ state-
ment, for Napolenn, at St. Helena, said that this had been his
plan. After events have happened and gone contrary to our ex-
pectations we cun make ourselves believe that we expected to do
differently.
With these treaties made, Napoleon was ready to receive the
obeisances of the Poles. To the deputation from vilna he said
that if he had been reigning when the first, second, and third
partitions took place, he would have armed all his people to
deliver the Poles. With a dramatic outbreak which carried with
him all the members of the deputation he seid, "I love the Poles;
for sixteen years I have seen your soldiers at my side on the
fields of Italy and on those of Spain. I hold the same policy
10
toward you that I held at my first appearance in Poland." He
had formerly been successful in instilling into the Poles a con-
8. Jomini, Life of napoleon X, vol. Ill, 336.
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didential and trustful feeling. Now again when he met them, he
carried them away at the outset by the brilliant prospects be-
fore them. Had he been intending to restore Poland, he could
have done so before, but he eluded that part of the agreement
whenever it came up. Hourrienne says that Napoleon previous to
entering on this last campaign had never entertained any positive
wish to re-establish Poland, though at a previous period he had
been strongly inclined to that re-establishment of which he
felt the necessity. .vhen Napoleon was in i^gypt he had had the
distress of the Poles keenly at heart and at the beginning of
the consulate, in spite of* the many things occupying his atten-
tion, he had considered that measure.
^
No doubt Napoleon may at one time have considered the re-
storation of Poland but ~t vilna in 1812 that idea was farthest
7
from his mind. He knew that Alexander was conciliating the
people of Lithuania • nd the other provinces, and he also knew
that he could have gained a^ very loyal support had he said the
word that would unite Poland, nut the treaties with Prussia and
giving
Austria guaranteed aid without committing himself toy any promises
to the Poles. The president of the deputation demanded "in the
interests of his empire as well as the honor of trance that he
restore .to land. His reply was evasive. If he were a pole he
would think and act as they did; situated as he was he had many
12duties to perform. ae told them that if their efforts were
unanimous their enemy would acknowledge their rights. He had
11. sourrienne, Memoirs of napoleon -Bonaparte . vol. ill, 177.
12. ibid., 244.
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guaranteed to the Emperor of iustria the integrity of his domains
and he could not do / nything that would disturb his quiet posses-
sion of his present Polish territories. 13 How careful Napoleon
was to guarantee the rights of the Austrian emperor before he
should meet with the Poles! The members of the deputation were
very greatly disappointed that he would promise no more even at
a time when their services were required. His war with Russia
had been hailed as the advent of their liberty, and the enthu-
siasm of the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw had been
unbounded, for they believed their country about to receive its
ancient glory and independence. Their ardor was somewhat cooled
after Napoleon's reply, and those Lithuanians who had been inclined
to aid the drench Emperor now became hostile. Indeed Napoleon
told his army, on entering Lithuania, that they were in the en-
emy's country. Instead of trying to conciliate the Polish peo-
ple in the province, he did everything to provoke them. Villages
were burned, castles pillaged, and provisions carried away. The
crops in the fields were laid waste, meadows devattatedand peo-
ple insulted. In spite of this ill treatment, however, many vol-
unteers joined his army. it Minsk and vilna especially, he was
was
rather joyfully received, but this/because the report had been
circulated by his officers that Poland was to be re-established.
However, the class of people with whom he had to negotiate were
very cool and reserved. They could not forget his numerous pro-
clamations, his broken promises, rnd his declaration that Lithuan-
ia was an enemy's country.
14 The provinces of podolia and Volhy-
13 jjourrienne, ivlemoirs of mapoleon Bonaparte , vol. Ill, 244.
14 ! ibid., 245 «
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nia were perfectly quiet and awaited passively the outcome of the
war.
Before proceeding farther it might be profitable to exam-
ine the secret treaties of Napoleon with Austria and Prussia as
Oginski gives them. The Emperor of the French had been incurring
the hostility of the Germans and the Dutch by arranging their
affairs to suit himself. In 1811, he began negotiations and 1812
a treaty with the Prussians was agreed upon. The clause in which
we are particularly interested is the one directed against Rus-
sia. By a secret convention, the King of Prussia agreed to fur-
nish a contingent of twenty thousand men having sixty cannon
besides those in the garrisons and the fortresses. Prussian
Poles were thus bound to serve with Napoleon ,who ensured to him-
self the aid of at least part of the Polish people without re-
storing their kingdom. In March of 1812, a like treaty was signed
with Austria; in this treaty, however, Napoleon guaranteed to
Austria the possession of Galicia even in case of the restoration
of Poland. But another article provided that if Napoleon should
see fit to restore Poland, a part of Galicia could be taken and
Illyrian provinces given in exchange. The partition of the pro-
vince was to be made on the basis of population, extent ,and rev-
15
enue.
With the same careful procedure but perhaps not with the
same skill and tact, Napoleon opened hostilities\vith Alexander.
In trying to conciliate the Poles he had incurred their distrust,
and in the same unreliable manner he tried to win it back again.
15. Memo ires de ^ichel Oginski , vol. Ill, 126.
I
tie can understand fully why, situated as he was under the two
treaties with Prussia and Austria, he could not think of restor-
ing the old Polish kingdom. His marriage with the Austrian prin-
cess necessitated his being on good terms with Austria. The
reasons for opening war with Russia were the laxness of Alex-
ander's policy in the continental system and the annullment of
the treaty of Tilsit; the protestation of the Tsar against the re-
the
union of/Duchy of Oldenburg to France; and finally he claimed
that Alexander had been arming since the commencement of 1811 and
had placed five divisions on the frontiers of the Duchy of Warsaw.
Such an act on Alexander's part could not be counted otherwise
than hostile from Napoleon's point of view, and he pretended to
be very angry, but on the other hand he was only too glad of a
break. Napoleon could not long be friends with anyone without be-
coming domineering; and in his friendship with /lexander he was
beginning to be anxious to have the upper hand. Once Alexander
had been called the most powerful monarch in Europe, and Napoleon
was very glad to be recognized by him. The "Star of Destiny "guid-
ed the Emperor on and he soon coveted the place of the Tsar and
made plans to usurp it.
In answer to Napoleon, Hussia demanded that the French
evacuate Prussia, for it was necessary for the good feeling of
France and Russia that a neutral power be between them and that
17
the garrison inDantzigbe reduced. Other demands not touching
Poland or Russia were made, and on the refusal of France, the
Russian ambassador obtained his passports and left Paris. Napol-
17. Memoires de Michel Oginski , Vol. Ill, 133.
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eon left for xresden and after interviewing the king of Prussia
and the Emperor of Austria he hastened to i'horn where he arrived
on June 5, 1812. ihe French ambassador , even on the plea of a
personal communication, was not allowed to enter vilna whither
the Tser had gone after Napoleon's refusal to accede to the de-
18mands, and he was given his passports. The French troops
were already approaching the frontiers of Russia. Italians,
lustrians, Saxons, Bavarians, Prussians, and seventy thousand
Poles, besides the French, composed Napoleon's troops. The Poles
assembled on the Vistula, and grand preparations were made for an
19enormous campaign.
On the Russian side, plans were carefully laid, and the great-
est tranquility reigned at St. Petersburg; one would hardly have
thought that a great war was approaching. The public was igno-
rant of all that was passing on the other side of the Vistula
beceuse communications with the Duchy of Warsaw were interrupted.
Since the departure of the Tsar for vilna, each new event which
threatened a rupture of peace did not reach St. Petersburg, and
the reason that Alexander had gone to Vilna was to secure peace
by negotiation. Alexander was very agreeable to the Lithuanian
nobles and he had a most careful regard for his new polish sub-
jects, taking pains to decorate some of them with the order of
St. Anne. At court it was noised about that the Emperor ^lex-
20
ander was going to declare himself king of Poland. This was
part of a note sent to Napoleon. Almost everything in the note
18. Memo ires de ,.:ichel Qginski . vol. Ill, 135.
19. ibid. , 147.
20. ibid., 148. Note quoted from a manuscript of 1812 by Baron
/ain, vol. I, 73-74.
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was untrue "but it aroused Napoleon who hastened his moves on
Russia. Oginski left St. Petersburg for Vilna in June, and was
very much surprised to see the strong patrols of French on the
frontiers of Mar saw.
He was well pleased with the conduct of the Lithuanians to-
ward him and their enthusiasm for him. He needed men for the army
and as a pre of of his confidence in them he was going to name a
committee composed of Poles to make a repartition of the proprie-
21taries given up. He found it necessary to give up several
plans on account of the lack of time to carry them out, and because
Napoleon's emissaries had worked up the people to such a pitch
that care must be taken in conciliating them. v^ord was received
just after the interview with Oginski that Napoleon had crossed
22
the Niemen.
After the news of the crossing of the Niemen, Alexander
held a conference with his o ficers. One of these officers, gen-
eral /rmfeldt, said that the suffering of the Poles during the
war would be enormous. The plan of campaign was retreat, in order
to draw Napoleon from his source of supplies. Napoleon occupied
several Polish villages. to his soldiers he said, "Soldiers, the
second war of Poland has commenced. The first was ended at jj'ried-
land and at Tilsit. The second war of Poland will be more glorious
23
to the arms of trance than the first." There was no mention of
Poland and the Poles in connection with a restoration, jwery
21. Memo ires de uichel uginski , vol. Ill, 152.
22. ibid., 157. As Oginski gives the fullest and most connected
account of the campaign in itussia and also the clearest pre-
sentation of the attitude of the Poles, information taken from
his book is used mainly in what follows.
23. correspondence de napoleon , vol. jlXIII, 529..
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word was uttered to stimultte them on to glory for trance, mo-
tivated by his own selfish purposes, mow could the inhabitants
of Lithuania respect his declared purpose when they had been
so basely insulted! It was inevitable that Lithuania should be-
come the theatre of the war, for .Napoleon was working for the
alliance of the Poles in that province against the conciliations
and proposals offered by Alexander. A great obstacle in his
way, as we have seen, was the restrained conservatism of the no-
bles, who remembered his unredeemed promises to the inhabitants
of the Grand i/uehy of Warsaw.
Directly that Napoleon crossed the Nieraen communications
with Lithuania were interrupted, /pril 10, 1812, the king of
Saxony as J-~anu Luke of Warsaw issued a decree in which he or-
dered a national guard to be formed of all the men from twenty
to forty years of age. A consulship was created to take charge
of all the affairs that the constitution gave to the sovereign.
June 26, Prince Adam uasimir UE&rtoryski, the father of Prince
._dam, proclaimed the restoration of the whole of ancient Poland
as an independent state. All officers, soldiers, and employees,
civil or military, who w<~re born Poles, were called upon to leave
the Russian service. A general council of twelve members was
invested with ^11 of the duties of the confederation, and the
King of Saxony, invited by a deputation of the council general
to adhere to the confederation, signed an act of accession, July
12. Another deputation made known to Napoleon their decisions,
and informed him that it was to the interest of France that the
24. Memoire 8 de ,.iichel Qginski . vol. Ill, 199.

65.
re -establishment of Poland be accomplished. The Poles further
reminded him of his past promises and said that if the partitions
of Poland were a sign of the decadence of trance, then the restor-
ation of the kingdom should be a sign of her prosperity. Always
had Poland turned her eyes toward France and regarded her as a
25great and generous nation. To this Napoleon made reply that
as always he loved the Poles; he himself had a great interest
in the country but he was so occupied with other affairs and had
so many interests to combine and conciliate that he could not
turn his attention toward restoring Poland, and as before on great
occasions of meeting with the Poles, he flattered them by his
terms of praise and by regretting that he could not do different-
ly. The deputation returned to the Diet disheartened by his evas-
ive replies, but nevertheless it declared the restoration of
Poland. Napoleon had a different plan of organization in mind
for Lithuania, and it is doubtful whether he would have unitec it
to the virand Duchy of i/Varsaw. Mis former policies suggest that
he would have found some excuse to keep it separate. Different
writers have different opinions as to the enthusiasm of the Poles.
Oginski tells us that the Poles in the lirand Duchy of Warsaw were
exceedingly enthusiastic about a restored Poland but he also leads
us to infer that the Lithuanians were just as enthusiastic about
the restoration of Poland. He informed the Tsar that if he did
not change conditions in that province, a revolt was likely to
ensue. Indeed, he feared that they would rise up against Kussia
25. :,iemoires de i.iichel Oginski , vol. Ill, 200.
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when iMapoleon cane to the frontiers. General Marbot, an officer
in the jj'rench. army, gives us another point of view. According
to his observations, the people in the ur^nd imchy of Warsaw
were the only ones who had retained their spirit of nationality
and their hopes for independence. Lithuania end the other pro-
vinces of ancient Poland, having been under Hussion rule for so
long, had lost entirely their remembrance of their old constitu-
tion, and considered themselves Russians. The Poles in Prussia
27
and Austria went to war because of fear of their new sovereigns.
They showed no enthusiasm whatever for iMapoleon. The inhabitants
of the Grand Tuchy of Warsaw were the only ones who were at all
»t .ached to i\lo.poleon, but Marbot asks us "Of what use was so small
27
a state for the grand army of Napoleon?"*" Marbot also assures
T\ of that he
us thet Napoleon* s reluctance was/ was afraid of their joining
of
Russia if he did not re-establish Poland but bec^use/^-heir incon-
stancy to him should he restore Poland to independence. He would
recognize them as a nation only when they were unanimously striv-
ing side by side for restoration. Not long before, an army of a
certain number of men was the price they must pay for recognition.
Napoleon was coolly treated in Vilna; had the Poles shown some
enthusiasm and some trust they might perhaps have recovered their
independence.
28 But the Poles were not sure/Napoleon however
they might treat him, and to say that they would perhaps have
have received their independence had they treated him better is
mode of
chimerical. Napoleon 1 s/ entrance into Lithuania did not call for
27. Memo ires du General de Marbot . Vol. Ill, 52.
28. ibid., 62 »
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honorable treatment and the Poles are not to he blamed for their
lack of hospitality.
Having occupied Vilna, Napoleon issued orders for a new form
of government for Lithuania, a provisional government composed of
seven members and a secretary general was provided for Lithuania.
was
Each of the governments of Vilna, Grodno, Minsk and Bialystok/pre-
to be
sided over by an intendent. For Vilna there was a mayor, four
adjoints and a municipal council composed of twelve members. P.
national guard composed of two battalions was created. Officers
occupying the various positions were Poles. Throughout the coun-
try all who had left their homes when troops marched through could
return to them. The officers of the district were to keep good
order and protect the peasants from injury or exaction. By Sep-
tember, a president of the provisionary commission, the count of
Hogendorp, had been appointed. Davovt maintained a strict dis-
cipline and by artful means succeeded in attaching a great many
to his person. Some of the Poles believed that he would be king
29
of a reunited Poland. While Davout kept a strict account of the
military affairs, Hogendorp was no less faithful in civil affairs.
How could Napoleon ever hope to conciliate the Lithuanians when
he placed such a man as the president of the commission over themJ
Perhaps he did not care to conciliate them. His one thought
was the glory of France and his own splendor, and such a thing
as a restless discontented people under his rule did not trouble
him. If Napoleon haa intended to unite Lithuania to the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw, it seems that the time to heve done so was at
29. Memo ire s de Michel Oginski . Vol. Ill, 215.
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his occupation, but his separate organization of that province
is almost convincing proof that he did not intend that the two
should be united.
Early in October of 1812, Alexander sent a communication
to Oginski, the substance of which was his declaration to re-es-
tablish Poland. Oginski was instructed to tell the Poles that
the Tsar relied on the confidence and help of the Poles who had
been coaxed away by Napoleon. A great many victories of the
the
French arms had been won by the valuable aid of/Poles and now
as before Napoleon needed the Poles, and needed them badly. Alex-
ander was urged to declare himself ing of Poland, as both Oginski
end Czartoryski thought that this was the surest way to attach
the Poles to Russia.** The Poles would leave the French arms
and come to the support of their own nation and Russia. No other
country in Europe, unless it were Austria, would oppose very
strenuously the independence of Poland. All Russians would re-
gard the restoration of Poland as an honorable termination of
the war. The protection of the Tsar extended over all classes
would prevent terror and persecution. To these requests an an-
swer might have been given when he appointed Koutousoff as head
of the Russian army. In the outline of his plan the Tsar could
say that Napoleon never intended to re-establish Poland. He was
using the Poles to glorify France. Alexander always appreciated
the Poles and honored their valor, their love, and their fidelity
toward their country and their sovereign. Furthermore, it might
be announced that Alexander had decided to restore Poland and to
30. Oginski, Vol. Ill, 227.
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declere himself king. The union with Russia would be only in
the person of the Tsar and his successors and their administration
would "be
/separate and based on the Constitution of May 3, 1791 . It was a
good plan but the main obstacles in the way were the reverses
of Russia. To declare Poland independent at this critical time,
when the Russian army was retreating, would throw all the forces
of Prussia and Austria into the arms of France. The Poles in
Napoleon's service end those in Lithuania would likely be per-
would be
secuted^and greater insults/offered than before.
'while all of these plans were in mind news reached St.
Petersburg of the evacuation of Moscow by the Russians. The Tsar
left for the front, but before he went granted an amnesty for the
31inhabitants of Lithuania ana White Russia. Oginski was over-
joyed for it seemed as if the clouds about the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw were clearing away and the inhabitants could soon welcome
their deliverer. The amnesty was regarded as a fore-runner of
great events in Poland, and the emperor himself said, "As soon as
our troops have occupied the Duchy of Warsaw, and we no longer
etc
fear the return of Napoleon, I will keep my promise. n%J* With
this promise, Alexander instilled new life into the Poles and
especially the inhabitants of Lithuania, who were greatly dis-
couraged by the retreat of the Russian forces.
The Duchy of Warsaw had sent eighty thousand men to fight
under the banners of Napoleon. Public and private misery raged
in the Duchy and its army was maintained only by great privation
31. Oginski, Vol. Ill, 262.
32. ibid., 266.
J
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Everything seemed to be working aginst prosperity. The civil
officers of the government could not be paid and the Continental
System which had been rigidly enforced had stopped the exports
33
of the country. * With everything in ruins, what would be left
to the people of the Duchy if Poland were restored? Many of its
farms were devastated by the passage of the armies over them,
and whole villages were deserted. Famine reigned supreme and
yet the army had to be supported. It is a great wonder that
the Poles did not become greatly discouraged before this, but
they seemed to place much confidence in Napoleon. In all the
battles and sieges of the campaign of 1812 the Poles fought
bravely and daringly. The intelligence of the Polish officers
and the valor of the troops was highly commented upon; if it
had not been for the Poles many of the strategic points would
not have been taken.
^
4
By the end of 1812 Napoleon was retreating rapidly with the
last remnants of his array over the Niemen with the Russians
close to their heels. He no longer appeared as the deliverer of
nations; his one desire was to remain a conqueror, and little
35
zeal was displayed for the restoration of Poland. With the
opening of the new year new levies were made, and Napoleon once
more called on the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for men; a sword and a
horse was enough to stop the Russians, he said. w But the peo-
ple of the Grand Duchy could do no more, and for Napoleon now to
make brilliant promises was mockery and insult. As if not real-
33. Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte , Vol. Ill, 246.
34. Oginski, Vol. IV, 12. (Note by the editor)
35. Cambridge Modern History . Vol. IX, 505.
36. Bourrienne, Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte , vol. Ill, 247.
(Editor* s note)
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izing the distressed state of the Duchy, the council of govern-
ment celled for a levy, and an arriere -bun . The kingdom of Po-
land was declared restored and the citizens called to arms for
the honor and glory of Poland. They had fought for other people
-57
and now they were to fight for themselves. What a pity they
had not made such a declaration before thisJ If only they could
have understood that they had a friend in Alexander, the restor-
ation might have been completed peacefully and without so much
loss and ruin to Poland and her citizens. The Polish army evac-
uated Warsaw in February, 1813, and settled at Cracow where it
remained until the first of May. The Russian army occupied War-
a
saw and/ supreme council of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw wt.s estab-
lished under Russian auspices and remained in power until the
close of the war.
In the meantime, negotiations between Prussia and Russia
resulted in a treaty of alliance in March, 1813. Negotiations
were slow, because Russia demanded a large part of Polish terri-
tory formerly Prussian, but this obstacle was overcome and Prus-
sia was promised an indemnity in northern Germany. ' Fighting
was renewed and Alexander kept in touch with the Poles. In May
Czartoryski wrote that the Prussian king was not at all opposed
to the existence of Poland for he felt the necessity of satisfy-
ing the wishes of the polish nation and considered these just
and reasonable.
40 In June of 1813 the powers agreed to an
armistice. Through Austrian mediation a peace was arranged and
37. Oginski, Vol. IV, 56.
38. ibid., 103.
39. Cambridge Modern History . Vol. IX, 513.
40. Czartoryski, Vol. II, 237.
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it was suggested thot the Grund Duchy of Warsaw be at oil shed and
that affairs should be set in order without the intervention of
France. The Emperor of Russia considered himself entitled to dis-
pose of the whole of the Duchy of Warsaw and all its fortresses
on the grounds that his troops had first occupied the Duchy. He
meant, as an act of grace and favor, to assign to Prussia the city
and territory of Dantzig. 41 Napoleon could not accept these terms,
for he had not given up his idea of a universal empire. Austria
had been arming during the short interval^ and in 'ugust she joined
the allies against Napoleon. In all of the battles, the Poles of
the Grand Duchy who were with Napoleon were in the thickest of the
fight. Napoleon met with reverse
s
t
and on March 31, 1814, the cap-
42itulation of Paris was signed. An article in the treaty of Fan-
might
taineblecin provided that all the Polish troops in French service_/
return home taking with them their arms, as a memory of their hon-
orable services; all the officers were to be allowed to retain the
4^
honors awarded them and the accompanying pensions.
Napoleon was no longer connected with the question of Poland.
For a long time before this, in fact since 1807 at the Peace of
Tilsit, he had ceasea to be interested in it except as a means to
an end, and that end, his own glorification. The benevolent atti-
tude of the Powers was shown in allowing the Poles to return home,
but whet was to be done with them, and how they were to be treated
as a nation had to be left until the final settlement. Now that
Napoleon had disappeared from European affairs, the Poles turned
41. State Papers , 1814-1815, Vol. II, 1175.
42. Oginski, Vol. IV, 131.
43. ibid.. 137.
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to Alexander as their deliverer, and we shall see that the Tsar
strove to keep his promise to the ever hopeful Poles.

74.
V.i'he Fate of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
19 Decided at the Congress of Vienna, 1815
At the end of the war in 1814, Alexander hed again taken
the lesd in Europe and it seemed that the Poles would profit "by
his favor. It was decided that a Congress of the Powers should
meet at Vienna to rearrange the affairs of Europe after so m^ny
years of disturbance. The question of settling such an import-
ant problem was more intricate than had been imagined
t
and var-
ious difficulties C;:jne up to hinder any rapid progress. Gre^t
territorial changes had to be made and the congress came near to
having a war about the settlement. It had no formal opening
and the powers negotiated long and vigorously. .Alexander thought
that he should be allowed to find compensation for his part in
overthrowing Napoleon in Poland, while Prussia and Austria should
find theirs in northern Germany and in Italy. * Russia's position
in the Congress was strong and her recent successes seemed to
remove all obstacles out of the way of her appropriation of the
whole of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Alexander had firmly in mind
the establishment of an independent Poland ,but he agreed that the
Grand Duchy, which must form the nucleus of the independent king-
dom, should he divided among the three powers. No doubt he
thought of securing the larger share. England at first was very
favorable to the re-establishment of Poland »but as time went on,
her policy changed also and she agreed that the Grand Duchy of
Warsaw must be divided and that the military fromtiers necessary
1. Cambridge Modern History . Vol. IX, 590.
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to the security of Austria end Prussia be established. Alex-
ander revealed an offer of concessions in Poland made by Metter-
nich in return for which he wae to keep Prussia out of Saxony.
While all of these disputes were going on, news reached
Vienna that the Grand Luke Constantine, who had been sent to
Warsaw to orgainze a Polish array, had issued a proclamation in
which he called upon the Poles to arm for the defense of their
country and their independence. "His Majesty, the Emperor, Alex-
ander, your powerful protector, made that call to you. Assemble
yourselves around the flag; arm yourselves for the defense of your
country and for the maintenance of its political independence.
While
/that noble monarch prepares for happiness to come to your country
rise up and support his noble efforts with the price of your blood.
The same leaders who for twenty years led you on the path to glory
know how to lead you to it now. The emperor appreciates your
bravery. In the midst of the disasters of a melancholy war, he
saw your honorable service in meeting emergencies which depend on
you. You have displayed great deeds with arms in a struggle to
3
which motive you were a stranger. " With such a proclamation the
Poles were called to arms and the Tsar was judged to have taken
his final stand on the Polish question. Castlereagh in writing
to Alexander to be careful of the degree and made of aggrandize-
ment of the Polish frontier said, "I should press these consider-
ations with more reluctance if I did not feel persuaded that there
is a course open
B. Cambridge Modern History , vol. IX, 591.
3. Oginski, Vol. IV, 1S4.
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to your Imperial Majesty to pursue which will combine your bene-
ficient intentions toward your Polish subjects, with wh.-.t your
allies and Europe, Sire, claim at your hands. They desire not
to see the Poles humiliated or deprived of a wide conciliatory
and congenial system of administration. They only wish. Sire,
for the sake of peace, to ameliorate gradually the frame of your
Polish administration and to avoid, if you are not prepared for
the complete reunion and independence of Polaad, that species of
measure, ..hich, unoer a title of higher import, may create alarm
both in Russia and the neighboring States, and which, however it
may gratify the ambitions of a few individuals of great family
in Poland, may, in fact, bring less real happinesp and liberty to
the people than a more measured, and unostentatious change in the
system of their administration."^ Here we may surmise, Castle-
reagh was hinting at any influence which men like Czartoryski or
Oginski may have hjad on the Tsar. He in a way acknowledges the
powerful position of Russia and wishes to avoid a disaster to
Russia's hopes. In other words, he was warning Alexander in a
conservative manner, against too hurried liberal measures.
After many disputes and fears and threats of war^ a treaty
was agreed upon. Austria recovered ell her Polish possessions
obtained by the first partition except Cracow which was declared
a free city. Prussia obtained the larger part of her former Po-
lish domains after the first partition and the fortress of Thorn
which Alexander yielded at the last moment. The rest of Poland
4. State Papers, 1814—1815, Vol. II, 1174--1175.

went to Russia. Thus the hopes of the Poles were again dashed
to the ground. But affairs were not to remain quiet, for Napoleon
returned to France and the Powers were called forth to drive the
Corsic;.n finally from Europe. For one hundred days people were
held in suspense wondering who would be conqueror, but Napoleon's
faculties had failed him, his Star of Destiny had waned, and he
was overcome at Waterloo. Late in May of 1815, the Powers again
agreed to a Final Act which should settle the conditions in Eu-
rope for all time. The greater part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
was secured to Russia under the title of the Kingdom of Poland
and such representative national institutions were to be allowed
as the government of Russia might determine. Before the Tsar
left Vienna he laid down the bases of the future Constitution of
Poland. Prussia's share of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw included
the fortress of Thorn with the surrounding territory, her Polish
acquisitions of 1772 and portions of the departments of Posen and
Kalisch. /ustria remained in possession of the parts of Galicia
obtained by the Peace of Vienna in 1806, and of the salt mines of
6
Wiliezka.
Oginski in his memoirs gives us a sketch of the most inter-
esting provisions of the Treaty of Vienna. "The Duchy of Warsaw
is united to the empire of Russia, forever. A part of this coun-
try having a population of eight hundred and ten thousand souls
will be possessed by the King of Prussia. The part of eastern
5. Cambridge Modern History . Vol. IX, 598.
6. ibid.. " 655.
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Galicia which was ceded to Russia in 1809, also that of the
proprietary of Wieliczka, will be given to Austria. The city of
Cracow will form a free and independent republic." Treaties
between Russia and Austria and Prussia were signed with reference
to the Polish territories and one article provided that the Po-
lish subjects of the high contracting parties should have nation-
al representation and national institutions. Amnesties were
granted and all Polish subjects were invited to return to their
homes. Cracow was given a constitution, the chief provisions of
which were: that the Catholic religion, Apostolic and Roman, was
to be maintained as the common religion of the country and all
Christian creeds were to be free; all citizens were to be equal
before the law, and the law was to protect equally even those
of the tolerated creeds; the government of the free city of Cracow
and its territory was to consist of a senate composed of twelve
members called senators, and a president. Nine were to be elected
by an assembly of representatives, the remaining four to be chosen
by the chapter and the academy; six of these senators were to
hold office for life; the president was to serve three years and
could be reelected. The rest of the senators were to change of-
fice every year; the assembly of representatives wss to meet once
7
a year. Craccw remained independent until 1846, at which time she
was annexed by /ustria.
On May 25, 1815 , Alexander issued a proclamation to the Poles,
in which he spolfce of the past war and said that the conceptions
6. Oginski, Vol. IV, 185.
7. ibid., 196.
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now prevailing in the world were to restore nations to their
own rights and to introduce free and liberal ideas. The Congress
of Vienna, had been organized to give peace to Europe and to erase
the calamities of war. A medal of gold was presented to Alexan-
der by the Polish Diet for his efforts in the restoration of Po-
8
land. The province of Lithuania was left to Alexander. On
December 1, 1815, the Tsar signed the constitution of Poland at
Warsaw. The main provisions embodied in this document were; that
the kingdom of Poland was to be forever united to the empire of
Russia, and the crown of Poland to be hereditary in the person of
the emperor and his successors following the order of succession
established for the Imperial throne of Russia, but the sovereign
alone should have the right to determine the participation of
Poland in the wars of Russia. That the Catholic religion would be
the religion of the kingdom but other religions would be tolerated.
Freedom of the press was guaranteed and everyone was equal before
the law. The Polish nation was to have a national representation
to consist of a Diet composed of a king and two chambers, the
first to be a senate and the second a house of deputies of the
communes. All government was to reside in the person of the king
who should name the senators, ministers, counsellors of state
and the presidents and judges of the different tribunals. The
execution to the laws was to be confined to the diverse branches
of public administration. The Diet was to deliberate on all pro-
8. Oginski, Vol. IV, 217.

jects of law civil and criminal and administrative alike, which
might he addressed to it by the council of State on the part of
the King. The army was to retain its national uniform. 9 If these
provisions had been carried out the Poles would have had little
reason to regret their state as settled by the Congress of the
Powers at Vienna. Alexander told them that their restoration
was definitely settled by a solemn treaty, sanctioned by a con-
stitutional charter and Poland now had a place among the nations
of Europe.
The Polish people were not as free as they wished to be.
All of their external relations were jealously watched by Russia
and the constitution provided that the nation should not enter intc
a war without the Tsar's consent. One promise of Alexander
either was not or could not be fulfilled and that was the plan
for uniting the provinces of Lithuania with those of the Grand
Duchy of Warsaw into one kingdom. Kosciuscko reminded the Tsar
of this promise. Without a doubt, Prussia and Austria stood in
the way of this union, and apparently England also, for Castle-
reagh's letter seemed to be hinting that the Tsar must not make
too much of an aggrandizement of territory on the part of Russia,
and of granting too much to the Poles in order to satisfy one or
two individuals. The courts of Europe feared a strong and power-
ful Poland. Their interests changed 7ith the change of circum-
stances against them. Eor Prussia and Austria to give up their
Polish territory to the new Kingdom would have been almost like
giving it to Russia. /lexander had declared himself king of
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Poland; and this territory would have been under his sceptre,
thus making a great enlargement to his domain extending into
Western Europe. Czartoryski leads us to believe that the trouble
about uniting all the Polish provinces was e;iused by Castlereagh 1
letter, in which as has been quoted, he hinted at the great sac-
10
rifice of Russia. Czartoryski also denies that the Poles
would be more dangerous if given their freedom, as some seemed
to think; and, if the kingdom were restored, any attempt on the
part of Russia to recover it would be opposed by Prussia, Austria
and Prance.11
The work of the Congress of Vienna had in a very unsatis-
factory way fulfilled the hopes of the Poles for the restoration
in its entirety of their ancient kingdom, but with the Grand
Duchy of Vvarsaw united to Russia and a constitution granted they
were willing to do their part toward keeping the peace. From
all the evidence Alexander seems to have wished to keep his pro-
mises of a restored and independent Poland, and after 1815, he
claims to have had the interests of the Poles at heart. From
an out of the way pla.ce in the world, St. Helena, echoes of Na-
poleon's desires for Poland have come to light in his correspond-
ence. He said that he called on Poland but she did not respond.
It was hie greatest hope to establish the kingdom of Poland as a
fort and a strong barrier against the incessant ambitions of the
12
Tsars. Could it be that he had forgotten how faithfully Poland
9. Oginski, Vol. IV, 217.
10. Czartoryski, Vol. II, 284.
11. ibid., 287.
12. Correspondence de Napoleon I er . Vol. XXXII, 358.
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had always responded to his bugle call and could he fail to
understand that he had overloaded the people with evasive re-
plies and unredeemed promises? It was his plan to take Galicia
from his treaty with Austria in 1812 that he had said this, but
his word was not to he trusted. He offered to make great sac-
rifices of French terrritory to indemnify Russia also, if she
would consent to give up her Polish territories for the restor-
ation of the ancient kingdom of Poland. He even thought at one
time of putting the crown of Poland on the head of the King of
Prussia, hut after her reverses, in 1807, Prussia showed such a
hatred for France that Napoleon formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw
14
instead. This does not harmonize very well with his actions
at the Treaty of Tilsit, when Alexander had to interfere on be-
half of Prussia, nor with the fact that the Grand Duchy was of-
fered to Russia. He remarked that he iid too much for Poland
and indeed he did, in the way of ruining the country and crushing
the hopes of the people. He hoped after the treaty of 1807 to re
store Poland, but the idea never entered his head to claim the
15
throne either for himself or his family.
Too much weight cannot be put on these statements, that
came after Napoleon had been away from Europe and had heard what
was done. It cannot be said that he did not intend to help the
Poles nor that he never entertained the idea of restoring Poland
13. Correspondence de Napoleon I er ? Vol. XXXII, 275.
from Austria and indemnify that country elsewhere. 13 We know
14. ibid.
,
15. ibid..
292.
293.
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to independence. Had he been successful in his campaign against
Russia, he might in a moment of good humor have proclaimed the
restoration of that kingdom, but it is doubtful whether, with
his plan of a universal empire in mind, it would have long re-
mained independent.
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VI. The Poles Since 1815
iiver since the Poles, by the settlement at Vienna in 1815,
were left separated under different flags, the Polish spirit
has "been restless and unsatisfied. Alexander's promises ss to a
constitution were faithfully carried out, and the Polish Diet
met for the first time in Warsaw in 1818. 1 One important fact
to be noticed in connection with the JDiet was that the liberum
veto was abolished and a majority of votes decided all question!,
.but Alexander wus soon occupied with other affairs and discon-
tent sprang up in the new kingdom of Poland. iiosciuszko had
prophesied that a different order of things from what they ex-
pected would come about, and that the Poles who had been given
the chief places in the government would be crowded out by the
Hussians. He was right, and the Polish name quickly fell into
disrepute and the people were treated with contempt. Liberty
of the press was withdrawn in July, 1819, and other restrictions
were put on their rights as defined by the constitution. The
chief power was vested in the lirand liuke Gonstantine who had
been appointed commander-in-chief of the army. He held the feel-
ings of others as naught and gave most vigorous play to his
violent end unjust contempt for the Poles. Revolution was slow-
ly gathering. Nicholas, who succeded Alexander in 1825, tried
in every way possible to win back the favor of the Poles and
to make them forget the policy of Hussification which he had
pursued immediately after his accession to the throne.
1 He came
1. Cambridge Modern History , vol. X, 466.
2. ibid.. 464.

85.
to need them just as Napoleon had needed them in 1812, for in
18E8 he became involved in a war with Turkey. At the close of
the successful war Turkish trophies were sent to the Polish
army.
Another thing which increased the indignation of the Poles
was the exposure of the Patriotic Society and the proceedings of
p
the Court of the Diet. A new secret association arose in vvar-
saw bearing the specific mark of a military comspiracy. The Poles
obtained news that they were to be used in the campaign against
France; and the promise of Alexander that Lithuania would be
united to Poland was not to be fulfilled. The violations of
their constitution and the broken promises aroused all Poland, so
that even the students in the university and the patriots joined
with the Polish army in the revolution of 1830. The Poles
fought bravely, but their affairs were badly managed by the Polish
Commander-in-chief, Skrzyvecki. Poland fell once more into the
hands of the Russians, and the constitutional kingdom ceased to
4
exist. The language and religion were attacked and a rigorous
attempt was made again to russianize Poland. 5 During the reign
of Nicholas there w<as no alleviation of the terrible suppression.
Alexander II was inclined to be more lenient in his treatment of
the Poles. A separate ministry was created for education and
religion, but discontent was brewing and secret societies again
came into existence. The russian government, suspecting e revo-
2. Cambridge Modern History , vol. X, 464.
3. ibid., 466.
4. ibid., 413.
5. Eversley
,
The Partitions of Poland , 292.
6. Cur. bridge !Toa"ern History . Vol. X, 628.
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lution, sent all the young men whom they thought connected with
the plot to Siberian and Caucasian military depots. h general
insurrection followed; but there was no army to sustain an
armed resistance, and the only hope for the Poles was in an in-
tervention of the western powers, especially jj'rance and England.
A diplomatic interference ensued in which hngland demanded that
the conditions of the Treaty of Vienna be fulfilled. /lexander II
replied that he had the most benevolent intentions toward the
Poles. As neither trance nor England was prepared to support
the Polish cause by a war, while Msmarck maintained Prussia in an
attitude of benevolent neutrality toward the Tsar, nothing more
7
was done. 'i'he insurrection was not put down until 1864. The
concessions of 1861 were withdrawn and Kussification was carried
Q
to an extreme. The present emperor, Nicholas II, has adopted
a more conciliatory attitude toward the poles and the language is
no longer forbidden in the churches and schools. The progress
of Poland up to the present time has been very marked, jj'ree
trade is carried on between Kussia and Poland; manufactories have
grown up and the population has increased; and the better condi-
tion of the peasants seems to reconcile them to Kussian rule.
t the outbreak of this present war Prussia, Austria, and
Kussia each bid for Polish support. Nicholas, C-rand uuke of
Russia, issued a proclamation to the Polish nation in which he
promised that at the close of the present war Pol nd would be
free. It is affirmed that progressive Kussian society has long
7. Cambr idge modern History , vol. a, 474.
8. ibid., 6£9.
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desired the freedom of Poland and that desire has now become a
Q
definite part of the program of the Russian nation. Poland
looks to England and to Russia for aid and in gratification sends
her people to help with the fighting. Polish legions have
been formed, officered by Poles, and are now at the front in the
thickest of the fight. Polish women administer comforts to
Russians in the trenches. But other "Polish legions with Polish
officers are fighting on the Austrian side, while Germany and
Austria are in possession of the entire territory formerly in the
Grand Duchy together with most of Lithuania, and have set up a
government there. Germans and /ustrians have also promised the
Poles the restoration of their kingdom. The Poles are actually
fighting each other even as they did in Uapoleon's days. Let us
hope that the illusions and dreams that are now entertained by the
Polish people may become real, and that once more they may have
their cherished desire of being a free and independent nation.
But may they know how to use this freedom and independence in
such an intelligent manner th8t their neighbors will have no op-
portunity to take a part in their government, or to erase again
its political existence.
9. Bariantinsky, Princess, , Poland' s Ordeal and Poland' g Hope .
Contemporary Review, Vol. 108, E05.
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C. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Bourriemie in his Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte faithfully
recites the episodes connected with the French Emperor's re-
lation with Poland, He does not confine himself to statements
influenced by prejudice in Napoleon's favor, but he is inclined
to "be critical of some of Napoleon's activities connected with
that country.
Czartoryski in his Llemoirs and Correspondence with Alexan-
der _I shows how the Poles were treated at the court of St. Pe-
tersburg. Connected as he was with the Russian Imperial family,
it is not surprising that he regarded doubtfully the aid that
Napoleon offered. He was confident of the success of his own
plans for Poland, and did not hesitate to bring them forth on
any occasion. Without a doubt he was one of the most ardent
patriots who ever worked for his country. He had many friends
in the politically influential circle in England, and their
correspondence with him reveals their deei. regard for him. In
spite of his international affiliations, Czartoryski never ceased
to be a Pole.
Oginski was a very earnest worker on behalf of Poland.
Many times he" felt the breath''of the French army when it invaded
Russia in 181E. Oginski, as well as Czartoryski, was deeply
interested in the restoration of Poland. His Memo ires contain
a collection of many of the documents connected with the Polish
provinces. He makes some very emphatic and uncomplimentary
II
I 1 - '
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statements about Napoleon and his motives. His interviews with
/lexander and the letters written to the latter, are not as
forcible as those of Czartoryski and show a less intimate
personal relationship. His diction is dignified, and eager,
yet forcible.
Fletcher gives a clear, condensed, and accurate account
of the History of Poland from the earliest times down to the
incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in the Empire of
Russia in 1815. He is sympathetic with the Poles, yet he feels
that from the first they were to blame for their own downfall.
Eversley's The Partitions of Poland gives an account of the
destruction of the kingdom from a British point of view, '^hile
it is clearly and accurately written it is colored with British
ideas; especially the last chapter in which he speaks of Poland
in connection with the Great War now going on.
Lord gives a short summary of Polish history before he be-
gins his narration of ghe Second Partition of Poland . He recites
the past glory of Poland and her downfall in a clear, concise
way. He lays stress on the jealousy of the nobility and the
lack of fct middle class to intervene in the affairs of the Diet.
Sorel in L'Europe et la Revolution ^rancaise looks at the
Polish question from all sides. He seems to be in sympathy
with the Poles, and doubtful as to Napoleon's intention of re-
storing Poland. Napoleon was shrewd and .Alexander was very
liable to be over-influenced, but v/hen once aroused he could
fight to the death.



